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ABSTRACT
Nkansa, Porschia C. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2016. Professional
Skepticism and Fraud Risk Assessment: An Internal Auditing Perspective. Major Professor: Dr.
Charles D. Bailey.
My dissertation focuses on examining the professional skepticism of internal auditors
related to fraud risk assessment and environmental characteristics. The dissertation is comprised
of three separate studies but the overall research question that is addressed is: How do certain
environmental pressures affect the professional judgment (in this case, fraud risk assessment)
and skeptical actions of internal auditors? The specific environmental factors examined in this
dissertation are: (1) the level of coordination with external auditors, (2) a perceived conflict with
legal counsel, and (3) the Chief Audit Executive’s emphasis on professional skepticism. Each
study consists of case materials (adapted from previous studies) with three parts: a fraud risk
assessment, an indication of skeptical action, and personality trait questionnaires (including a
professional skepticism scale). The results of this dissertation will be useful to audit committees,
boards of directors, chief audit executives, corporate managers, external auditors, and regulators.
The purpose of the first study is to investigate how the level of coordination with the
external auditor affects internal auditors’ fraud-related actions. Planned audit hours are the
measure of skeptical action in this study. Prior research suggests that accountability strength
influences auditor effort. The effect of external auditor coordination on internal auditors’ planned
audit hours has important implications for efficiency and perceived accountability to external
stakeholders. Regulators and stakeholder organizations have encouraged more collaboration
between external and internal auditors to improve audit efficiency and fraud detection. An
experiment is conducted with 112 internal auditors to examine the theorized effects. The study
uses a 2 × 2 between-subjects design and manipulates fraud risk (low or high) and external
auditor coordination (low or high). Consistent with predictions, I find that internal auditors
iv

increase planned audit hours when fraud risk is high and that coordination moderates the
relationship between fraud risk and hours. The results illustrate that although high external
auditor coordination decreases internal auditors’ hours (reflecting efficiency), internal auditors
are more sensitive to responding to fraud risk when coordination is high (reflecting
accountability).
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CHAPTER 1
More is More: Does Increased External Auditor Coordination Influence Internal Auditor
Effort?
INTRODUCTION
As fraud issues continue to plague companies, the role of internal auditors as mechanisms
of corporate governance has expanded. Both the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) and the Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) have issued guidance
that allows external auditors to utilize internal auditors’ assistance when the work of internal
auditors is expected to affect the financial statement audit and when assessing the risks of
material misstatement. Over the past few years, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA),
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), Crowe Horwath LLP, Deloitte, and Protiviti
(a global business consulting and internal audit firm) have issued practical guidance relating to
fraud risk assessment for internal auditors. The Anti-Fraud Collaboration (AFC)1 advocates that
boards of directors, internal and external auditors, and financial executives work together in
deterring and detecting fraud.
Internal auditors play an important role in mitigating fraud within organizations (Beasley,
Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides 2000; Coram, Ferguson, and Moroney 2008), while external
auditors are responsible for assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud (AICPA
2002). Fraud research indicates that 16.5% of occupational fraud2 cases were detected by internal
auditors, while only 3.8% were detected by external auditors in 2014 and 2015 (Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners 2016). A 2013 roundtable held by the AFC discussing the expectation
1

The AFC is comprised of the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), Financial Executives International,
Institute of Internal Auditors, and National Association of Corporate Directors.
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Occupational fraud includes asset misappropriations, corruption, and financial statement fraud.
1

gap in deterring and detecting financial statement fraud, revealed that 31% of survey participants
believe that internal auditors are primarily responsible for detecting fraud, while 12% assigned
this responsibility to external auditors (AFC 2013). The survey participants included corporate
directors, financial executives, external auditors, and internal auditors. Due to the low rate of
fraud detection by internal and external auditors (a combined 20%), it is not surprising that
regulators in the auditing profession are calling for enhancements to professional skepticism,
while stakeholder organizations (the CAQ and IIA) are engaging in efforts to reduce the risks of
financial reporting fraud. Consequently, stakeholder organizations’ increased focus on fraud
detection and regulators’ increased scrutiny on audit quality bring the internal-external auditor
relationship to the forefront.
The IIA and PCAOB provide guidance discussing the coordination between internal and
external auditors. IIA standards state that the chief audit executive should coordinate activities
with other external providers of assurance (e.g. external auditors) to ensure proper coverage and
minimize duplication of efforts (IIA 2012). The PCAOB’s Interim Auditing Standard AU
Section 322: The Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit of Financial
Statements (2003, paragraph .23) states that external auditors coordinate work with internal
auditors by “holding periodic meetings, scheduling audit work, providing access to internal
auditors’ working papers, reviewing audit reports, and discussing possible accounting and
auditing issues.” AU Section 322 also states that external auditors may request direct assistance
from internal auditors with external auditors supervising, reviewing, evaluating, and testing the
work performed by internal auditors (PCAOB 2003). While the auditing literature provides
evidence about how coordination impacts the work of external auditors (Gramling, Maletta,
Schneider, and Church 2004), little is known about how external auditor coordination impacts
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the work of internal auditors. Understanding how internal auditors’ behavior is affected by their
coordination with external auditors is important because this is an economically important
relationship that can be facilitated by a deeper understanding of the interaction between both
types of auditors.
The purpose of my study is to examine how the level of coordination with the external
auditor affects internal auditors’ fraud risk assessment procedures. In this study, external auditor
coordination represents the extent to which internal auditors collaborate with external auditors
during the financial reporting process. More coordination between internal and external auditors
could lead to an increase in fraud detection as expressed by the AFC. Previous accounting
literature has not investigated the link between internal auditors’ fraud-related judgments and
actions but it does provide evidence of a link between external auditors’ fraud-related judgments
and actions (Carpenter and Reimers 2013; Quadackers, Groot, and Wright 2014). I predict that
an environmental factor, the level of coordination with the external auditor, will influence
internal auditors’ fraud-related actions with respect to the number of planned internal audit
hours.
The study uses a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with the factors of fraud risk (low or
high) and level of coordination with the external auditor (low or high) being manipulated. I
examine the effects of these independent variables on internal auditors’ planned audit hours.
Planned audit hours measure the internal auditors’ work effort. I rely on psychological research
to develop a hypothesis about the potential difference in the planned audit effort made by
internal auditors with low external auditor coordination versus internal auditors with high
external auditor coordination. Psychology research indicates that accountability strength affects
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effort (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This study’s sample includes 112 internal auditors representing
both public companies and nonpublic organizations in 17 different industries.
The results indicate that internal auditors budget more audit hours under the high fraud
risk condition than the low fraud risk condition. This finding suggests that internal auditors are
sensitive to fraud red flags and appropriately respond to environments with higher fraud risk.
There is a negative association between the level of coordination with the external auditor and
hours, which suggests that internal auditors practice audit efficiency. However, a significant
interaction between fraud risk and the level of coordination with the external auditor indicates
that the effect of fraud risk on hours depends on coordination. Moderation analysis shows that
internal auditors who are under the high fraud risk and high coordination conditions exert more
audit effort. This finding suggests that these conditions induce an accountability effect that
reduces audit efficiency.
The results of this study have research, policy, and practice implications. From a research
perspective, the findings provide evidence that coordination influences the actions of internal
auditors. There are no studies that examine external and internal auditor coordination from the
internal auditing perspective; most of the relevant auditing literature examines the factors that
affect external auditors’ reliance on the work of internal auditors (Gramling, Maletta, Schneider,
and Church 2004). This study also answers previous calls for research to: (1) explore the
relationship between internal auditors’ sensitivity to fraud risk factors and their subsequent
auditing procedures (Church, McMillan, and Schneider 2001), and (2) separately consider
internal auditors in a direct assistant or reliance role (Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood 2011). From a
policy perspective, the study’s findings suggest that high coordination with the external auditor
influences internal auditors’ perceived accountability for detecting fraud. This result is
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informative to regulators and the AFC as they work to improve coordination between key
stakeholders in the financial reporting process and increase fraud detection. From a practice
perspective, the results provide insight to chief audit executives, CFOs, and audit committees
about the effect of coordination on audit efficiency and internal auditors’ fraud-related actions.
The next section discusses background information, reviews the literature, and develops
the hypotheses. The following sections present the experimental design, method, results, and
conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Internal Auditors and Fraud Risk Assessment
Internal auditors are charged with corporate governance, and the International Standards
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards) specifies their responsibilities
related to fraud (IIA 2012). IIA Standard 1220: Due Professional Care discusses how internal
auditors must exercise due professional care by considering the probability of fraud (IIA 2012).
IIA Standard 2060: Reporting to the Senior Management and the Board states that the Chief
Audit Executive’s report to senior management and the board must include significant risk
exposures and control issues, including fraud risks. IIA Standard 2120: Risk Management (IIA
2012) explicitly mentions that internal auditors “must evaluate the potential for the occurrence of
fraud and how the organization manages fraud risk.” IIA Standard 2210: Engagement Objectives
states that internal auditors must consider the probability of fraud during the development of
engagement objectives. Moreover, an IIA Practice Guide outlines the important role internal
auditors play in fraud risk management due to the intimate knowledge obtained by working in
their organizations (IIA 2009). In summary, internal auditors’ role as internal mechanisms of
corporate governance has expanded and so have their fraud risk assessment duties.
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Previous accounting literature discusses internal auditors’ fraud risk assessment
processes. Hillison, Pacini, and Sinason (1999, 361) note that “…internal auditors are in the best
position to prevent, deter, and detect fraud.” Church, McMillan, and Schneider (2001) highlight
how internal auditors are sensitive to factors that affect the possibility of fraudulent financial
reporting. Rezaee (2002) mentions that continuous monitoring by internal auditors can aid in
identifying red flags that may signal the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Gramling and
Myers (2003) provide evidence that internal auditors attach the same level of importance to fraud
warning signs as external auditors. However, DeZoort and Harrison (2008) reveal that internal
auditors assign the highest percentage of fraud detection responsibility to managers, followed by
internal accountants and internal auditors. Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose (2010) illustrate how
perceived threats to independence and objectivity lead internal auditors to lower assessed levels
of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee versus management. Burnaby, Howe, and
Muehlmann (2011) show that internal auditors identify skepticism, recognizing potential fraud
opportunities, and risk assessment skills as being the most effective traits for detecting top fraud
risks at their organizations.
Prior auditing research establishes the link between fraud risk assessments and audit
testing (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Brazel, Carpenter, and Jenkins 2010; and Hammersley,
Bamber, and Carpenter 2010). Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) find that external auditors
modify the nature of their audit plans under high fraud risk and note that more audit testing will
result in additional budgeted hours. Brazel, Carpenter, and Jenkins (2010) document evidence
that fraud risk assessments are more positively associated with changes to the nature, staffing,
timing, and extent of external auditors’ fraud-related audit procedures when audit teams engage
in higher quality brainstorming sessions. One of Hammersley, Bamber, and Carpenter’s (2010)
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findings is that external auditors who document specific fraud risks identified during audit
planning increase their requests for audit evidence. There is limited research that examines the
link between internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments and audit testing. Fullerton and Durtschi
(2004) provide evidence that internal auditors with high levels of professional skepticism exhibit
a higher degree for information search when confronted with more fraud symptoms. Therefore, I
predict that similar to external auditors, internal auditors will increase their audit effort when
fraud risk is high. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Higher fraud risk increases internal auditors’ planned audit hours.
Although H1 is expected to be strongly upheld, it is an important condition for the second
hypothesis, which examines the moderated effect of external auditor coordination.
External Auditor Coordination and Accountability to Stakeholders
Previous accounting literature focuses on external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit
function, but it has not examined whether external auditor coordination influences the actions of
internal auditors. Maletta’s (1993) findings suggest that inherent risk impacts the extent to which
internal auditors’ work affects external auditors’ decisions to use them as assistants. Campbell
(1994) confirms that external auditors do agree about the specific activities that constitute
reliance on internal auditors. One of these activities is external auditors using internal auditors’
workpapers for most of the detailed audit documentation (Brink and Witt 1982). Gramling
(1999) documents that audit managers whose clients impose a high level of external audit fee
pressure rely on internal auditors’ work to a greater extent than audit managers whose clients
emphasize audit quality. Felix, Gramling, and Maletta (2001) develop and test a model that
indicates that the extent of coordination between internal and external auditors is one of the
factors that determines internal audit contribution to the external audit. Abbott, Parker, and
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Peters (2012) provide evidence of a moderating relationship between internal audit function
assistance and coordination with the external auditor using archival data. Recently, Petherbridge
and Messier’s (2015) mention that accountability to the PCAOB influences external auditors’
reliance on the internal audit function.
Fraud research highlights the importance of investigating the environmental conditions
related to the detection of fraud by external auditors (Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman
2000). Such an investigation is also important for internal auditors because DeZoort and
Harrison (2008) document that internal auditors report moderate levels of responsibility for fraud
detection, with accountable participants feeling more responsible for fraud detection than
anonymous participants. Accounting research suggests that accountability to other stakeholders
can influence auditors’ judgment processes (Hurtt, Brown-Liburd, Earley, and Krishnamoorthy
2013), while psychological research indicates that individuals tend to make decisions that others
find acceptable and without bias when they are held accountable for their decisions (Simonson
and Nye 1992; Tetlock and Lerner 1999). Also, previous literature provides evidence that the
accountability to reviewers acts as an incentive that can affect both auditors’ judgments and
actions (Rich, Solomon, and Trotman 1997, Turner 2001, Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman 2010,
and Carpenter and Reimers 2013).
Hurtt et al. (2013) mention how the auditors’ awareness of their responsibility to third
parties (e.g. other stakeholders) is an area related to external environmental characteristics that
may affect an auditor’s behavior. For example, Gibbins and Newton (1994) find that
accountability situations lead to increased cognitive effort for their sample of auditors. Lerner
and Tetlock (1999) describe one type of accountability as the “presence of another” where
participants expect their performance to be observed. This type of accountability relates to the
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level of external auditor coordination because high coordination involves the internal auditor’s
performance being directly observed by the external auditor. Accounting literature that has
investigated accountability pressure indicates that it increases effort (Koonce, Anderson, and
Marchant 1995, Tan 1995, Chang, Ho, and Liao 1997, Cloyd 1997, Asare, Trompeter, and
Wright 2000, and DeZoort, Harrison, and Taylor 2006). Boyle, DeZoort, and Hermanson (2015)
illustrate that accountability to external stakeholders positively influences internal auditors’ fraud
and control risk assessments. Therefore, it is expected that internal auditors who are highly
coordinated with and working under the direct supervision of external auditors (or held more
accountable to external auditors who are an external stakeholder in the financial reporting
process) will exert more audit effort. Specifically, I expect the level of fraud risk on planned
audit hours to be moderated by the level of external auditor coordination where internal auditors
will respond more strongly to high external auditor coordination compared to low external
auditor coordination. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: External auditor coordination strengthens (moderates) the relationship
between fraud risk and planned internal audit hours.
The environmental factor in this study is the level of coordination with the external auditor. If the
level of external auditor coordination (i.e., low or high) is a factor that influences internal
auditors’ planned audit hours, the mechanism should be consistent with the model in Figure 1.
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Conceptual Model:

External Auditor
Coordination
M

Fraud
Risk

Planned
Hours

H2

Y

X
H1
Statistical Model:

Covariates

X
FRAUDRISK

𝑏1

M

𝑏2

EXPERIENCE
GENDER
AGE
PROFSKEPT
Y

COORDINATION

𝑒𝑌

𝑏3

HOURS

XM
FRISK × COORD
FIGURE 1
Moderation Model*

*Modified from Hayes, A. 2013. Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A
Regression-based Approach. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Notes:
X is the causal variable, M is the moderator, and Y is the outcome.
𝑏1 , 𝑏2 , and 𝑏3 are the regression coefficients in the estimation model of Y; and 𝑒𝑌 is the error in
the estimate of Y.
The conditional effect of X on Y is 𝑏 1 plus 𝑏3 𝑀.
The names of the constructs and variables in the current study are inserted in italics (modified
from Hayes 2013, 442). The hypotheses are inserted in the dashed boxes.
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD
Participants
The participants are 112 internal audit professionals representing seven IIA chapters3 and
companies in the U.S. Given the fraud flags listed in the study, I attempted to reach out to survey
participants with sufficient internal audit work experience. Internal auditors representing
different industries were also sought after in order to obtain generalizable results.
Survey questionnaires (see Appendix A) were distributed to participants online via email
invitation and in person at Memphis IIA Chapter meetings. In total, requests were sent to 2,534
target participants. I received 199 total responses but only 112 were usable. Fifteen surveys were
missing data, eight surveys were incomplete, two respondents failed the first manipulation check
(outsource assumption), 35 failed the second manipulation check (coordination level with the
external auditor), two respondents failed both manipulation checks, 19 outliers were removed,
and six respondents did not have internal audit experience. This study’s response rate of 7.85% is
comparable to other studies with internal auditor samples (Stefaniak, Houston, and Cornell 2012;
Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2010). The average completion time for the experiment was 11
minutes.
Research Design
The experiment involves a 2 × 2 between-subjects design. Fraud risk is manipulated as
low or high, following Norman et al. (2010), and external auditor coordination is manipulated as
low or high (see Appendix A). Following AU Section 322 (PCAOB 2003), the high external
auditor coordination condition states that the internal auditor directly assists the external auditor,
while the low external auditor coordination condition states that the external auditor relies on
3

The Chapter Presidents of these IIA chapters emailed their members the survey link on behalf of the
author. Participants were also solicited to sign up for the online version of the survey at Memphis Chapter
meetings and the author was allowed to distribute paper versions of the survey at two chapter meetings.
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work already performed by the internal auditor. Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood (2011) highlight the
importance of researchers separately considering the use of internal auditors as assistants
(operationalized as high coordination in this study) and reliance on work previously performed
by the internal audit function (operationalized as low coordination in this study).
Independent and Moderating Variables
As illustrated in Figure 1, the level of fraud risk is the independent variable. It is
manipulated as either low or high, following Norman et al. (2010). The low fraud risk condition
includes six low fraud cues, whereas the high fraud risk condition includes six high fraud risk
cues. As expressed in Hypothesis 2, the moderating variable is external auditor coordination. As
discussed above, the level of external auditor coordination is manipulated as either high (the
external auditor asks the internal auditor for direct assistance, in which the internal auditor will
work under the direct supervision of the external auditor and have highly coordinated audit
activities) or low (the external auditor relies on work already performed by the internal auditor,
in which the internal auditor will have very little interaction with the external auditor) based on
AU Section 322 (PCAOB 2003) and following Felix, Gramling, and Maletta (2001), Abbott,
Parker, and Peters (2012), and Pizzini, Lin, and Ziegenfuss (2015). AU Section 322 provides
guidance on how external auditors should use the work that has already been (independently)
performed by internal auditors or utilize internal auditors to provide direct assistance under the
external auditor’s supervision (PCAOB 2003). Furthermore, archival auditing studies have
measured coordination using a four-point scale ranging from a relationship characterized as
coexistence (“1’), coordination (“2”), integration (“3”) and partnering (“4”) (Felix et al. 2001;
Abbott et al. 2012). Thus, direct assistance (partnering) is operationalized as high external
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auditor coordination, whereas relying on work already performed (coordination) is
operationalized as low external auditor coordination.
Covariates are experience, gender, and age based on previous studies with internal
auditor samples (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004; Norman et al. 2010). Also, professional
skepticism is included as a covariate to control for higher skeptics increasing their audit effort
(Hurtt 2010). Choo and Tan (2000) provide evidence that a skeptical attitude influences the
ability to detect fraud. Burnaby et al. (2011) document that internal auditors identify skepticism
as being the most effective skill at detecting top fraud risks. Quadackers, Groot, and Wright
(2014) find that professional skepticism is positively correlated with external auditors’ number of
budgeted hours. Previous studies (Cohen, Dalton, and Harp 2014; Quadackers et al. 2014) use
the HPSS (Hurtt 2010) to measure auditors’ neutrality. The HPSS (see Appendix A) will be used
to measure the professional skepticism of internal auditors in this study.
Dependent Variable
Planned audit hours are the dependent measure. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright
(2007) state that planned hours are a more direct measure of audit effort than external audit fees.
Participants are asked to indicate the amount of audit hours that they would budget for audit
testing. Planned audit hours are measured as the fraud-related action in this study (Hoffman and
Zimbelman 2009).
Instrument and Procedure
The participants completed an instrument (see Appendix A) consisting of the following
sections: (1) introduction and consent, (2) company background information (company, industry,
financial reporting requirements, control environment, financial information, and fraud risk
flags), (3) external auditor coordination level, (4) professional skepticism scale questions, and (5)
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demographic questions and manipulation checks. The case materials present a publicly-held
company that has stable financial health, competent managers, and a reputable internal audit
department. The case materials are adapted from previous studies (DeZoort and Harrison 2008;
Norman et al. 2010). In addition, the Director of Internal Audit at a Fortune 500 company
reviewed the survey instrument to ensure a realistic setting. The instrument was also given to
five internal auditors working in three different industries for pilot testing and feedback.
Internal auditors who completed the online version of the survey accessed the instrument
via a link that was emailed to them. The survey link was randomized, participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions (either low or high fraud risk and low or high
external auditor coordination).4 After providing consent, the participants were presented with
information about the internal audit function, hypothetical company, related financial
information, and coordination level with the external auditor. The participants were then asked to
rate the likelihood of fraud (on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 = low and 7 = high5,
adapting Norman et al. [2010]) based on the information set. Next, participants were asked to
indicate how many hours they would allocate to audit testing, following Quadackers et al.
(2014). The next portion of the study assessed the internal auditors’ professional skepticism (a
covariate in this study as discussed above), in which participants completed the Hurtt
Professional Skepticism Scale. Following Hurtt (2010), participants were informed only that the
scale is designed to measure personal characteristics and that there are no right or wrong answers
to the questions. In the final section of the survey, participants answered demographic and
manipulation check questions.

4

The paper copies of the survey that were distributed to Memphis IIA Chapter members were also
randomized.
5

Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that setting scale lengths at 7 points maximizes variance.
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RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked two manipulation check questions. First, participants were asked
whether the internal audit function is non-outsourced or outsourced, following Norman et al.
(2010). Second, they were asked whether the external auditor will rely on work that has already
been performed for testing controls over cash and accounts receivable or asks for direct
assistance. As stated previously, two respondents failed the outsourced manipulation check (1.0
percent), 35 failed the coordination manipulation check (17.6 percent), and two failed both
manipulation checks (1.0 percent). This failure rate is similar to other internal auditor studies
(Norman et al. 2010; Boyle et al. 2015).
Demographics
Demographic information for the 112 participants is shown in Table 1. There are slightly
more female (61) than male (51) participants. The age range is 22 to 65 years old, with most
falling in the 25–34 age range. Most are very experienced (72 have more than five years of
professional internal audit experience, and 40 have less than five years of experience). Forty-six
of the participants also have external audit experience. A majority of the participants, 95 (or 84.8
percent) currently work in a non-outsourced internal audit department. The participants work in
various industries, with the highest concentrations in government, healthcare, banking, higher
education, and shipping. Seventy-eight hold at least one certification, with the CIA and CPA
designations being the most common. Members of the IIA constitute 94.6 percent. They are also
well educated with 61 holding a graduate degree. The mean score on the HPSS is 142, with a
range from 119 to 176 (of 180 possible points). The internal auditors’ average HPSS score is
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slightly higher than that of Hurtt’s (2010) original external auditor sample (139). Ninety-one (or
81.3 percent) of the participants have evaluated fraud risk prior to receiving the survey.
TABLE 1
Demographic Information
n = 112
Gender
Age

Total years of professional experience in internal audit

Total years of professional experience in external audit
Current position

Industry

Professional certifications

Member of the Institute of Internal Auditors
Highest degree
Professional skepticism score
Evaluated fraud risk prior to this case

16

Female
61
Male
51
22–24 years old
3
25–34
39
35–44
31
45–54
23
55 years or older
16
Less than 5 years
40
5–15
44
More than 15
28
1–5
32
5–14
14
Non-outsourced
95
Outsourced
2
Other
15
Banking
14
Casino and Gambling
1
Finance and Insurance
7
Government
16
Healthcare
16
Higher Education
13
Manufacturing
6
Professional Services
4
Real Estate
3
Shipping
12
Technology
1
Other
19
CFE
23
CIA
42
CPA
42
Yes
106
No
6
Bachelor’s Degree
51
Graduate Degree
61
Mean
142
Range
119–176
Yes
91
No
21

Multivariate and Moderation Analysis
The following model is used to test the relationship between planned audit hours and the
possible predictor variables that are shown in Figure 1:
HOURS = α + β1 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + β2 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + β3 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 × 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁
+ COVARIATES
where:
HOURS = the natural logarithm of planned internal audit hours
FRAUDRISK = dummy variable for high or low fraud risk (0 = low, 1 = high)
COORDINATION = dummy variable for high or low coordination with the external auditor
(0 = low, 1 = high).
FRAUDRISK × COORDINATION = interaction term between fraud risk and coordination
IAEXP = years of professional internal audit experience
EAEXP = years of professional external audit experience
GENDER = dummy variable for the sex of the participant (0 = female, 1 = male)
AGE = age of the participant in years
PROFSKEPT = the participant’s score on the HPSS
Table 2 provides the pairwise Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of the
regression model. None of the independent variables are highly correlated with each other, so it
does not appear that multicollinearity is an issue. A few of the variables have significant
correlations with HOURS. As predicted in H1, there is a positive correlation between HOURS
and FRAUDRISK. COORDINATION and AGE are negatively correlated with HOURS.
Controlling for internal auditors’ EAEXP is unique to this study and it is interesting that it is also
negatively correlated with HOURS.
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TABLE 2
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
n = 112
HOURS = α + β1 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + β2 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + β3 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 × 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + COVARIATES

HOURS FRAUDRISK COORDINATION
FRAUDRISK
0.264**
COORDINATION -0.214*
0.000

IAEXP

EAEXP

GENDER AGE

IAEXP
-0.142
-0.095
-0.111
EAEXP
-0.210*
0.077
0.198*
-0.116
GENDER
0.118
-0.054
0.054
0.094
-0.033
AGE
-0.242*
-0.067
-0.113
0.654** 0.229* -0.065
PROFSKEPT
0.112
0.032
0.012
0.077
-0.099
-0.128 0.043
____________________
**, * Denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, two-tailed.
HOURS is the natural logarithm of planned internal audit hours. FRAUDRISK is a dummy
variable for high or low fraud risk (0 = low, 1 = high). COORDINATION is a dummy variable
for high or low coordination with the external auditor (0 = low, 1 = high). IAEXP is years of
professional internal audit experience. EAEXP is years of professional external audit experience.
GENDER is a dummy variable for the sex of the participant (0 = female, 1 = male). AGE is the
age of the participant in years. PROFSKEPT is the participant’s score on the HPSS.
Table 3 presents a planned comparison of HOURS under the two fraud risk conditions
using an independent sample t-test. H1 predicts that planned audit hours will be higher under the
high fraud risk condition than the low fraud risk condition. I find that the mean internal audit
planned hours under the high fraud risk condition (169.38) is significantly higher than the mean
hours under the low fraud risk condition (100.54, t = -2.866, p = 0.005). This finding provides
support for H1, suggesting that internal auditors increase their audit effort when fraud risk is
high. As discussed below, however, the effect is contingent upon the level of COORDINATION.
TABLE 3
Independent Group T-test between HOURS and FRAUDRISK

Variable
Hours (H1)
Low Fraud Risk
High Fraud Risk

p-value
Standard Deviation t-statistic df (2-tailed)

N Mean
56 100.54
56 169.38
18

90.13
155.52

-2.866

110

0.005

Table 4 shows the results of the moderation analysis depicted in Figure 1. The
moderation analysis includes a regression and a test of the key conditional effect of interest. The
regression, in Panel A, shows that HOURS is negatively related to COORDINATION (p =
0.002), positively related to FRAUDRISK subject to the interaction between FRAUDRISK ×
COORDINATION (FR × C, p = 0.036), and positively related to GENDER (p = 0.025), with R2
= 0.227. H2 predicts that the level of external auditor coordination will strengthen (moderate) the
relationship between fraud risk and internal audit hours. The estimated positive coefficient of FR
× C indicates that the effect of FRAUDRISK on HOURS does depend on the level of
COORDINATION and provides support for H2. In addition, Panel B shows that this key
conditional effect is significant (p = 0.002) under the high external auditor coordination
condition (COORDINATION = 1), based on a 95% confidence interval.
TABLE 4
Moderation Analysis using PROCESS Procedure (Hayes 2013)
HOURS = α + β1 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + β2 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + β3 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 × 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + COVARIATES

Panel A: Effects of FRAUDRISK and COORDINATION on HOURS and Demographic Covariates

Variable
Intercept
FRAUDRISK (FR)
COORDINATION (C)
FR × C (H2)
IAEXP
EAEXP
GENDER
AGE
PROFSKEPT
R2
n

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient
Estimate
3.8117
+
0.0448
-0.7636
+
0.7055
-0.0047
-0.0443
0.3867
-0.0143
+
0.0098
22.67%
112
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t-statistic
3.4311
0.1921
-3.2135
2.1287
-0.3976
-1.4079
2.2760
-1.3273
1.3382

p-value
0.0009
0.8480
0.0018
0.0357
0.6917
0.1622
0.0249
0.1873
0.1838

TABLE 4 (Continued)
Panel B: Conditional Effect of FRAUDRISK on HOURS at values of COORDINATION

95% Confidence Interval
Effect
SE
t-statistic p-value Lower Limit Upper Limit
0.0448 0.2333 0.1921
0.8480
-0.4178
0.5074
0.7503 0.2335 3.2138
0.0017
0.2873
1.2133

COORDINATION
Low
High
_______________
For a discussion of this method of moderation analysis and the related tests, see Hayes (2013,
Chapter 7).
Figure 2 illustrates the interaction between FRAUDRISK and COORDINATION. It shows
that internal auditors indicate less planned audit hours under the low fraud risk condition.
However, internal auditors indicate significantly more planned audit hours under the high fraud
risk condition than under the low fraud risk condition when the level of coordination with the
external auditor is high (reflecting accountability).

Low

High

FIGURE 2
Internal Auditors’ Planned Audit Hours
This figure illustrates the planned internal audit hours for the FRAUDRISK (low, high) and
COORDINATION (low, high) treatment combinations. Participants were asked to indicate how
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many hours they would want to budget for substantive testing the cash and accounts receivable
accounts.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates internal auditors’ sensitivity to fraud risk flags and the effect of
the level of external auditor coordination on internal auditors’ fraud-related actions as measured
by planned internal audit hours. The findings indicate that internal auditors do exert more audit
effort when fraud risk is high. While increased coordination with the external auditor results in
less planned audit hours, I also find an interaction indicating that internal auditors exert
significantly more audit effort when both fraud risk and external auditor coordination are high
than when fraud risk is low and external auditor coordination is high. Since DeZoort and
Harrison (2008) provide evidence that internal auditors report moderate levels of responsibility
for fraud detection, this finding provides insight that more coordination with the external auditor
under high fraud risk conditions could raise internal auditors’ accountability for detecting fraud.
Previous auditing studies have only examined coordination from the external auditor
viewpoint but since relationships are a two-way street, it is important to examine how
coordination affects the actions of internal auditors. This study provides evidence that the level
of external auditor coordination does have an impact on internal auditors’ fraud-related actions.
Tysiac (2015) discusses how the duties of internal and external auditors intersect and mentions
that frequent communication between internal and external auditors can enhance audit quality
(CAQ and IIA 2015). This study contributes to the literature by examining the relationship from
the internal auditing perspective and providing much needed insight from an understudied aspect
of the internal auditor-external auditor relationship.
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This study is subject to a few limitations. First, I recognize that evaluating fraud risk is a
complex task and the limited amount of information provided in this study’s case would be
insufficient in most internal auditors’ work environment. The information was condensed in this
study’s case in order to reduce the time burden on survey participants and increase the survey
response rate. Second, although planned audit hours are used as a measure of effort in external
auditor studies, they may not be as homogeneous among a diverse sample of internal auditors
who work for companies of varying sizes with different business objectives. While I did consider
controlling for industry type6, I did not collect internal audit staff size data which may have
addressed this issue. Third, the high rate of respondents failing the coordination manipulation
check question (about 18%) suggests that some participants did not understand whether they
were directly assisting the external auditor or only providing workpapers even though it appears
in the instrument twice.
Future research can examine whether the accountability effect extends to internal audit
managers as previous studies highlight management’s strong organizational identity (Golden,
Dukerich, Fabian 2000) and primary concern for effective and efficient audits (KPMG and
Forbes 2016). Additional research using different tasks, problem-solving scenarios, and decision
aids can be conducted to explore how coordination affects internal auditors’ actual performance
(Mala and Chand 2015).
The results of this study have implications for research, policy, and practice. Despite
prior research’s main focus on coordination from the external auditor standpoint, this study’s
results provide evidence that coordination also has an effect on internal auditors’ actions. This
study also answers two previous calls for research to closely examine internal auditors’

6

When the variable INDUSTRY was included as a covariate in the regression model, it was not significant
(p = 0.637).
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sensitivity to fraud and related auditing procedures (Church, McMillan, and Schneider 2001),
and two role types (either direct assistance or reliance) (Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood 2011). From a
policy perspective, the results provide regulators with information that heightened coordination
between internal and external auditors has a positive impact on internal auditors’ fraud-related
actions by raising internal auditors’ perceived accountability. From a practice perspective, the
findings offer chief audit executives, CFOs, and audit committees insight that more coordination
with the external auditor results in audit efficiency (less planned internal audit hours) but there is
an accountability effect (more planned internal audit hours) related to high fraud risk
environments. Even though it is well documented that coordination aids external auditors, this
study’s findings indicate that it benefits internal auditors as well.
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CHAPTER 2
Turning a Blind Eye: Do Legal Conflicts Prevent Internal Auditors from Exercising
Professional Skepticism?
INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey conducted on behalf of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Research
Foundation, 55% of chief audit executives report pressure to change their audit reports
(Rittenberg and Miller 2015). Internal auditors have also expressed frustration with general
counsels being more concerned about a company’s reputational and legal risks and attempting to
eliminate these risks from internal audit reports (Chambers 2015a). A specific example of legal
intervention in internal audit activities involves Dow Chemical Company’s chief council being
the most vocal in telling the head of internal audit what was a valid business expense for Dow’s
CEO (Schneyer and Grow 2015). Dow’s CEO ended up reimbursing the company around
$719,000 for personal expenses that were classified as business expenses (Schneyer and Grow
2015). Consequently, such pressures threaten internal auditors’ independence and objectivity. To
remain objective in performing their duties, internal auditors must exercise professional
skepticism. They must also exhibit moral courage to withstand external pressures. Moral courage
represents possessing the fortitude to convert moral intentions into actions despite pressure to do
otherwise (May, Chan, Hodges, and Avolio 2003).
The purpose of my study is to investigate how behavioral characteristics (professional
skepticism and moral courage) and an environmental factor (conflict with legal counsel) affect
internal auditors’ judgments and actions. While numerous studies have investigated the
professional skepticism of external auditors, only one study has examined the professional
skepticism of internal auditors (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004). Heath and Staggs (2015) discuss
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the importance of internal auditors demonstrating objectivity while conducting audits and
mention that professional skepticism is a key component of objectivity. Thus, professional
skepticism may be an important understudied antecedent to internal auditors’ judgments and
actions. In relation to moral courage, IIA executive leaders have stated that internal auditors must
have courage. Anton van Wyk, the 2014-2015 IIA Global Chairman of the Board, has included
courage as an element of his adopted theme called “Mind the Gap.” He discusses how courage
involves not being afraid to ask questions and deal with aspects that impair internal auditors’
ability to get things done. Van Wyk also believes that stakeholders expect internal auditors to be
courageous and stand up to address organizational issues. Furthermore, in Richard Chambers’
(the president and CEO of the IIA) discussion about the FIFA bribes and racketeering scandal, he
echoes van Wyk’s sentiment that internal auditors must be courageous to do what needs to be
done in spite of opposition (Chambers 2015b). Since moral courage has been shown to be
positively related to ethical behavior (Hannah, Avolio, and Walumbwa 2011b), it may be an
antecedent to internal auditors’ actions.
The examination of whether professional skepticism, moral courage, and legal conflict
influence internal auditors’ judgments and actions is important for a couple of reasons. First,
external pressures may adversely affect internal auditors’ judgment and decision-making
processes even though internal auditing standards require internal auditors to maintain an
unbiased attitude and the IIA Code of Ethics requires internal auditors to disclose all material
facts (IIA 2013a). Previous research has shown that structures (legal, organization, and
regulatory) influence internal auditors (Rittenberg and Miller 2015; Roussy 2015). As a result,
internal auditors face role conflicts while balancing the interests of managers, audit committees,
and their profession (IIA standards). In terms of legal structure, internal auditors may have to
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gather and disclose information that negatively impacts the organization from a legal
perspective. Role conflicts undermine transparency and are a threat to corporate governance.
Second, the results of this study will provide insight on whether certain personality traits help
internal auditors not bend to pressures that are not aligned with the rules of their profession. This
investigation is timely as Rittenberg and Miller (2015) recommend that internal auditors
determine their moral compasses and identify where they need to stand their ground in order to
manage external pressures.
The results of this study will contribute to the literature in a few ways. First, this study
answers Nelson’s (2009) call to assess the structural form of his professional skepticism model
by examining how incentives and traits interact in their effects on skeptical judgment and action.
In this study, I propose that legal conflict is a disincentive to skeptical judgment and action.
Second, studying the professional skepticism of internal auditors will help assess an understudied
component related to their objectivity. Third, Hannah, Avolio, and May (2011a) note the lack of
research in all fields that investigates the link between moral courage and action. Hurtt, BrownLiburd, Earley, and Krishnamoorthy’s (2013) specifically call for the examination of the link
between moral courage and skeptical action. This study will examine this link in an accounting
setting. Also, previous literature to my knowledge has only examined the moral courage of naval
officers and soldiers (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009; Hannah, Avolio, and Walumbwa
2011b). This study extends previous studies by measuring the moral courage of internal auditors.
The results of this study will be useful to regulators, audit committees, boards of directors, and
chief audit executives.
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Professional Skepticism Framework
Auditing standards and accounting literature have provided several definitions for
professional skepticism. SAS No. 1 states that professional skepticism is “an attitude that
includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence” (AICPA 1972). On the
global front, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) adds that the skeptical auditor
should be on alert when audit evidence is contradictory to information received from
management and other parties responsible for corporate governance (IFAC 2006). Hurtt et al.
(2013) note how over time accounting literature has defined professional skepticism as a
conservatism bias in audit judgment (McMillan and White 1993), the opposite of trust (Shaub
1996), the ability to detect fraud (Choo and Tan 2000), the equivalent of independence (Kadous
2000), and presumptive doubt (Nelson 2009). Hurtt (2010, 151) takes a more neutral stance by
asserting that professional skepticism is “the propensity of an individual to defer concluding until
the evidence provides sufficient support for one alternative/explanation over others.” Hurtt et al.
(2013) propose that professional skepticism is expressed through an auditor’s skeptical judgment
and the resultant skeptical action (change in behavior from skeptical judgment). Most recently,
Nolder and Kadous (2014) extend the Hurtt et al. (2013) model by describing professional
skepticism as an attitude and adding an affective aspect as the third component of professional
skepticism.
While there is not a specific requirement in the IIA standards for internal auditors to
exercise professional skepticism, IIA Standard 1120: Individual Objectivity states that internal
auditors must have an impartial and unbiased attitude (IIA 2012. Cushing (2000) notes that
auditors’ beliefs should not be biased in either a positive or negative way. Nelson (2009)
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describes how auditing standards foster the “neutral” view of skepticism by requiring auditors to
not assume any bias in management representations. Thus, the IIA standards’ view of
professional skepticism is consistent with the neutral perspective. Glover and Prawitt (2013, 18)
state that internal auditors, and other stakeholders in the financial reporting process, “…have the
responsibility to properly apply skepticism.” Therefore, in this study, internal auditors’
objectivity is examined as their exercise of professional skepticism.
Nelson (2009) presents a model that illustrates how auditor judgments are produced by
combining audit evidence (or evidential input) with auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives.
The model also shows how auditor actions are produced by combining auditor judgments (that
reflect some level of professional skepticism) with auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives
(Nelson 2009). Additionally, Nelson (2009) mentions that professional skepticism is a product of
auditor judgment, but since it is revealed through skeptical behavior, it is an attribute of auditor
performance. He proposes that evidential input and auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives
affect both skeptical judgment and skeptical action (Nelson 2009). “Skeptical judgment occurs
when an auditor recognizes that a potential issue may exist and that more work or effort is
necessary. Skeptical action occurs when an auditor changes his/her behavior based on the
skeptical judgment” (Hurtt et al. 2013, 47). Building upon the Nelson model, Hurtt et al. (2013)
propose a skepticism framework that includes the four antecedents: auditor characteristics,
evidence characteristics, client characteristics, and environmental characteristics.
The current study examines the auditor characteristics of professional skepticism and
moral courage, and the environmental characteristic of a conflict with legal counsel. Auditor
characteristics that influence skeptical judgment include individual differences (traits),
motivation, moral reasoning, and affect. Environmental characteristics that influence auditor
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professional skepticism include regulations, standards, the control environment, accountability to
other stakeholders (e.g. reviewers and regulators), legal liability, and incentives to skeptical
action. Nelson (2009) notes that prior psychology and accounting research have identified that
auditors’ judgments are susceptible to various issues which include preventing incentives from
affecting judgment in unconscious ways. He also discusses how certain pressures can discourage
auditors from taking action (Nelson 2009). Thus, I propose that a conflict with legal counsel is a
disincentive to internal auditors’ skeptical judgment and action (as shown in Figure 3). The
addition of moral courage in Figure 3 as a moderator of the link between skeptical judgment and
skeptical action is an extension of Nelson’s (2009) model and takes Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
moderator distinction discussion into consideration.
Characteristic
MORAL COURAGE
Skeptical
Judgment
SKEPJUDGE

Skeptical
Action
SKEPACT

H4
H2b

H1

H2a

H3

Disincentive
LEGAL CONFLICT
Characteristic
PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM
Covariate
FIGURE 3
Professional Skepticism Model*
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*Adapted from Nelson, M. W. 2009. A model and literature review of professional skepticism in
auditing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 28 (2): 1–34.
Notes:
The names of the variables in the current study are inserted in capital letters (modified from
Nelson 2009). The inclusion of moral courage (in the dashed box) as a moderator of the link
between skeptical judgment and skeptical action is an extension of Nelson’s (2009) model. The
italicized boxes illustrate the hypothesized links which are also shown in Figure 4.
Role Conflicts and Pressure
Internal auditors are responsible for reporting what they believe to be control
deficiencies, material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, or opportunities for improvement
(Leech 2015). Roussy (2015) provides evidence that internal audit reports are affected by role
conflicts. Role conflict is defined as the extent of conflicting expectations associated with a role
(Pei and Davis 1989). Role theory proposes that an organization is an open social system
composed of interacting social actors (Katz and Kahn 1978). The organization is viewed as a
structure of roles in which social actors (individuals who work for the organization) have
expected roles or perform clusters of activities (Katz and Kahn 1978). Literature indicates that
role structures influence internal auditors (Pei and Davis 1989; Van Peursem 2005; Verstegen,
Loo, Mol, Slagter, and Geerkens 2007). In carrying out their responsibilities, internal auditors
may be exposed to conflicting expectations from company management, audit committees,
boards of directors, and legal counsel. Roussy (2015) illustrates that internal auditors experience
two types of role conflict, inter-sender and inter-role conflict. Inter-sender conflict occurs when
the expectations of individuals giving orders (different role senders) do not agree, whereas interrole conflict occurs when the expectations related to a particular role are in conflict with
expectations linked to another role performed by the same individual (Katz and Kahn 1978).
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Previous accounting research indicates that role conflicts are prevalent in the internal
audit practice (Van Peursem 2005; Ahmad and Taylor 2009; and Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose
2010). Pei and Davis (1989) document a direct relationship between internal auditors’
organizational-professional conflict and role stress. According to Pei and Davis (1989),
organizational-professional conflict is induced by the conflict between professional and
organizational norms, whereas role stress is a combination of role conflict and role ambiguity (or
the extent of perceived uncertainty involved in accomplishing role requirements). Greenspan,
Burns, and Lightle (1994) provide evidence that internal auditors’ decisions are affected by
perceived responsibilities to competing organizational groups. The authors call for the IIA to
provide additional standards to prevent internal auditors from being pressured to adopt
perspectives of specific organizational groups (Greenspan, Burns, and Lightle 1994). Ahlawat
and Lowe (2004) find that the role of the internal auditor’s company in an acquisition affects
internal auditors’ inventory-related judgments. Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, and Church (2004)
highlight the factors that bias internal auditors’ judgments and actions. Dunn (2006) discusses
increased internal auditor liability in internal disclosure contexts where conclusions or opinions
are provided to management and the audit committee. Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose (2010)
provide evidence that perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud
risk when reporting to the audit committee as opposed to management.
More recently, Roussy (2015) describes how political pressures influence internal
auditors’ coping behavior which affects their ability to perform their governance duty in terms of
independence. Rittenberg and Miller (2015) reveal that the political pressure put on internal
auditors forces them to manipulate audit findings by omitting or modifying damaging findings.
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This paper extends the Rittenberg and Miller (2015) study by examining whether a conflict with
legal counsel influences internal auditors’ judgments and actions. IIA Practice Advisory 2400-1:
Legal Considerations in Communicating Results states that “the internal auditor’s need to
prepare engagement records may conflict with legal counsel’s desire to not leave discoverable
evidence that could harm the organization’s position in legal matters” (IIA 2013b, 1). The
practice advisory also mentions that internal audit disclosures may negatively impact the
organization from a legal perspective and notes that a sudden revelation can place internal
auditors at odds with legal counsel (IIA 2013b). The examination of conflicts in the internal audit
setting is critical as Trompeter, Carpenter, Jones, and Riley (2014) list inaction in the face of
knowing and the fear of consequences of disclosure as factors associated with the concealment of
fraud.
Environmental factors have been shown in the accounting literature to affect the skeptical
judgments and actions of auditors (Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, and Church 2004; Nelson
2009; Carpenter and Reimers 2013; and Hurtt et al. 2013). Friedberg (1998) mentions that
internal audit investigations can give rise to complex and conflict-laden ethical situations. This
study’s environmental factor is a conflict with legal counsel (operationalized as legal conflict). If
legal conflict is a factor that influences internal auditors’ skeptical judgments and actions, the
mechanism should be consistent with the model in Figure 4, based on the moderated mediation
effects model of Hayes (2013, 450).
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Conceptual Model:
Skeptical
Judgment
M
H2a

Moral Courage
V
H2b

H1

H4

X

Y
H3

Legal Conflict
Statistical Model:

Skeptical Action

𝑒𝑀
Covariates

M
a

SKEPJUDGE

X

𝑏1

PROFSKEPT
EXPERIENCE
GENDER
AGE
IIAMEMBER

𝑐′
.

LCONFLICT

Y
𝑏2

V
MCOURAGE

𝑒𝑌

SKEPACT

𝑏3

MV
JUDGEMC
FIGURE 4
Moderated Mediation Model 14*
*Modified from Hayes, A. 2013. Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A
Regression-based Approach. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Notes:
X is the causal variable, V is the moderator, M is the mediator, and Y is the outcome.
a, b, and c are the regression coefficients in the estimation models M and Y; and 𝑒𝑀 and
𝑒𝑌 are errors in the estimates of M and Y, respectively.
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The conditional indirect effect of X on Y through M = a(𝑏1 + 𝑏3 𝑉).
The direct effect of X on Y = 𝑐 ′ .
The names of the constructs and variables in the current study are inserted in italics (modified
from Hayes 2013, 450).
The hypotheses (which are also shown in Figure 3) are inserted in the dashed boxes.
Previous literature provides empirical evidence that internal auditors succumb to external
pressures by altering damaging findings in their audit reports or omitting them altogether
(Rittenberg and Miller 2015; Roussy 2015). As mentioned above, prior research has shown that
conflicting role pressures and perceived threats negatively influence both internal auditors’
judgments (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004; Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose 2010) and actions
(Greenspan, Burns, and Lightle 1994; Rittenberg and Miller 2015). This leads to the following
hypothesis of a mediated effect:
H1: Legal conflict decreases internal auditors’ skeptical action through its
effect on skeptical judgment.
Although the individual links of the mediated effect (links 𝑎1 and 𝑏1 in Figure 4) are of interest
(and supported by theory as noted above), they do not need to be significant in order to support
H1 (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007; Hayes 2013). The ultimate goal of the mediation model
is to investigate whether legal conflict influences skeptical judgment that results in skeptical
action (as moderated by the characteristic of moral courage). Hypotheses about these
intermediate links are included for completeness:
H2(a): Legal conflict decreases internal auditors’ skeptical judgment.
H2(b): Skeptical judgment increases internal auditors’ skeptical action.
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It is possible that legal conflict could decrease internal auditors’ skeptical action without
the mediation effect of skeptical judgment. For example, Roussy (2015) illustrates that role
conflicts have a constraining impact on internal auditors’ actions. Also, Rittenberg and Miller
(2015) show that political pressure negatively influences internal audit findings. Therefore, legal
conflict is expected to decrease internal auditors’ skeptical action. This leads to the following
hypothesis, concerning link 𝑐′1 of the model:
H3: Legal conflict has a direct negative effect on internal auditors’ skeptical
action, over-and-above any effect being mediated by skeptical judgment.
Moral Courage
Moral courage is defined as “the ability to use inner principles to do what is good for
others, regardless of threat to self, as a matter of practice” (Serkerka and Bagozzi 2007, 135).
May, Luth, and Schwoerer (2014) state that moral courage involves raising ethical problems at
work even if it is unpopular. Organizational behavior literature introduces the idea of moral
courage as being key in determining the course of actions an individual will take and proposes
that there is a relationship between the individual recognizing an ethical challenge and desiring
to act with moral courage (Serkerka and Bagozzi 2007). The authors argue that acting with moral
courage depends on situational and contextual factors which include organizational directives
and social pressure (Serkerka and Bagozzi 2007). Similar to Serkerka and Bagozzi (2007),
Bailey, Scott, and Thoma (2010) discuss Rest’s Four Component Model (1986) by showing that
moral character influences how an individual acts in response to an ethical situation. It is
important to examine whether internal auditors act with moral courage to fend off external
pressures that may cause them to violate IIA Standards and their profession’s Code of Ethics.
Libby and Thorne (2007) include being courageous as an instrumental virtue in their instrument
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measuring auditors’ virtues. Similarly, Hurtt et al. (2013) note a belief in moral courage
influencing auditors to take action on the judgments that they make .
Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo (2009) present an instrument to measure professional
moral courage (PMC). Like professional skepticism, PMC is multi-dimensional. The PMC Scale
(PMCS, see Appendix B) is composed of five themes: moral agency, multiple values, endurance
of threats, going beyond compliance, and moral goals (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009).1
The PMCS is a 15-item scale with each item reflecting a 7-point scale ranging from 1 for “never
true,” 7 for “always true” and a mid-point of 4 for “sometimes” (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo
2009). 2 Respondents’ moral courage is measured by averaging the items for each dimension.
Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo (2009) test the PMCS by using confirmatory factor analysis to
analyze its convergent and discriminant validity. Respondents of the PMCS’s validation study
are officers in the U. S. Naval Supply Corps. The authors use two scales to measure the five
dimensions of PMC. The first scale includes items identified during critical incident interviews
with U. S. Naval Supply Corps officers and the second scale’s items are based on an analysis of
moral content in the courage literature. The first scale will be used in this study as the authors
find its psychometric properties to be slightly superior to those of the second scale (Sekerka,
Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009). Results of the confirmatory factor analysis indicate high levels of
trait variance for the five moral courage dimensions which achieves satisfactory convergent
1

Moral agency reflects a predisposition toward moral behavior and persistence of the will to engage
(Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009). Multiple values represents the ability to draw on multiple value
sets and effectively sort out and determine what needs to be exercised (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo
2009). Endurance of threats involves the will to proceed with a moral response expecting and accepting a
personal sacrifice (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009). Going beyond compliance reflects the ability
to consider rules while going beyond compliance-based measures to also consider what is right, just, and
appropriate (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009). Moral goals suggest that virtues (like prudence and
honesty) are used throughout the decision-making process to achieve a virtuous outcome (Sekerka,
Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009).
2

A shortened 10-item scale will be used in this study.
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validity (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009). The measures of the five dimensions also
demonstrate discriminant validity based on statistically significant correlations (Sekerka,
Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009).
Prior ethics-related research discusses how moral character affects individual’s actions.
Rest’s Four-Component Model (Rest 1986) lists the four psychological processes that must occur
in order for moral behavior to occur as: moral sensitivity (Component 1), moral judgment
(Component 2), moral motivation (Component 3), and moral character (Component 4). Moral
character refers to the processes that are involved in executing an action (Rest 1986). Rest (1986)
mentions how perseverance, strong character, and inner strength are attributes that lead to
success in Component 4. In relation to moral courage, Arnold and Ponemon (1991) find that
internal auditors with higher levels of moral reasoning are more likely to disclose sensitive audit
findings even when retaliation by management is likely. Reynolds (2000) highlights that the
internal auditors’ Code of Ethics has a strong moral approach as compared to the approach of
certified professional accountants. Peterson and Seligman (2004) mention that moral courage is a
stable character strength. Libby and Thorne (2007) include being courageous as an instrumental
virtue that is associated with auditors’ exercise of professional judgment. According to Hannah
and Avolio (2010), moral courage promotes action. Similarly, Gini (2011, 4) states that ‘[m]oral
courage is a stimulus, a catalyst for action.” Hannah, Avolio, and Walumbwa (2011b) document
the positive relation between moral courage and pro-social and ethical behaviors. Brinkley
(2015) states that it takes courage to report potentially serious violations that occur within
companies. Since moral courage is expected to strengthen (moderate) the relationship between
judgment and action, the previous discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
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H4: The greater the moral courage, the greater the relationship between
skeptical judgment and skeptical action.
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD
Participants
The target number of participants is 100 internal auditors. Survey questionnaires (see
Appendix B) will be distributed to potential participants. The survey participants will span a few
geographic locations (Los Angeles and other cities), have sufficient work experience, and
represent different industries in order to obtain generalizable survey results. Additionally, I
expect to perform pilot testing with at least five internal auditors.
Research Design
For the first stage of the study, participants will read case materials of a company’s
information (see Appendix B) and indicate whether they should report the audit finding using a
seven-point scale (–3 to +3), anchored by “definitely should include” and “definitely should not
include” (operationalized as skeptical judgment and adapting Pinsker, Pennington, and Schafer
2009). Participants will be randomly assigned to the “legal conflict” treatment group or the “no
legal conflict” control group. Next, participants will be asked to indicate whether they would
report the audit finding (in light of pushback from legal counsel or without this pushback for the
control group) using a seven-point scale (–3 to +3), anchored by “definitely would include” and
“definitely would not include” (operationalized as skeptical action and adapting Pinsker,
Pennington, and Schafer 2009). The participant’s answer to this question is the dependent
variable. For the second stage of the study, there will be an initial assessment of the internal
auditors’ professional skepticism (measured as a covariate in this study, see discussion below)
and moral courage, in which participants will complete the HPSS (see Appendix B) and PMCS
(see Appendix B). Following Hurtt (2010), participants will be informed only that the scales are

39

designed to measure personal characteristics and that there are no right or wrong answers to the
questions. The two scales should take participants 10 minutes or less to complete.
After the administration of the experiment, each participant will be asked demographic
questions including certifications obtained, years of experience, position, gender, etc. The total
administration time of the experiment is expected to be less than 20 minutes.
Independent, Mediating, and Moderating Variables
As illustrated in Figure 4, legal conflict is the independent variable. As expressed in
Hypothesis 1, the mediating variable is skeptical judgment. As expressed in Hypothesis 4, the
moderating variable is moral courage. As discussed above, participants will be asked to indicate
whether they should and would report the audit finding using seven-point scales. The moderating
variable, moral courage, will be measured using the PMCS (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo
2009) which has been tested in organizational behavior literature. Finally, the skeptical judgment
and skeptical action ratings of high and low skeptics, and high and low moral courage
participants will be compared.
Covariates are experience, gender, and age based on previous studies with internal
auditor samples (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004; Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose 2010). IIA
membership will be included as a covariate because Harrell, Taylor, and Chewning (1989)
document that internal auditors who are IIA members resist management’s efforts to bias their
internal control evaluations. Also, professional skepticism is included as a covariate to control
for higher skeptics increasing their skeptical judgment and action (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004;
Rose 2007; Hurtt 2010; Hurtt et al. 2013).
Previous studies (Cohen, Dalton, and Harp 2014; Quadackers, Groot, and Wright 2014)
use the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale (HPSS; Hurtt 2010) to measure auditors’ neutrality;
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therefore the HPSS (see Appendix B) will be used to measure professional skepticism of internal
auditors in this study. Hurtt (2010) suggests that professional skepticism is a multi-dimensional
individual characteristic and develops a 30-item professional skepticism scale to measure an
individual’s level of trait professional skepticism. The HPSS measures six characteristics: a
questioning mind, a suspension of judgment, a search for knowledge, interpersonal
understanding, self-esteem, and autonomy. Hurtt (2010) observes that her sample of 200 auditors
from a major international auditing firm score a mean of 138.6 on the HPSS, which ranges from
30 to 180. The internal consistency coefficient using Cronbach’s alpha is 0.863, while the testretest reliability correlation between first and second HPSS scores is 0.85 and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level (Hurtt 2010). One study that investigates the effect of internal
auditors’ professional skepticism on fraud detection highlights that individuals classified as high
skeptics responded more skeptically to fraud symptom sub-categories than those classified as
low skeptics which validates the HPSS (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004).

3

DeVellis (1991) states that a Cronbach’s alpha between .80 and .90 is very good.
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CHAPTER 3
Do Managerial Influence, Professional Skepticism, and Need for Closure Differentially
Affect Auditors’ Fraud-Related Judgments and Actions?
INTRODUCTION
According to the Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global
Fraud Study, it is estimated that organizations lose 5% of their revenues each year to fraud
(ACFE 2016). Due to recurring fraud scandals, standard setters are calling for improvements to
audit quality, corporate governance, and fraud investigation. Consequently, internal auditors’
role in risk assessment (including fraud risk) has grown exponentially. In relation to fraud risk
assessment, the need for cognitive closure and professional skepticism are two behavioral
characteristics that affect the professional judgment of auditors while the tone at the top is an
environmental factor that affects auditor behavior. The need for cognitive closure is the desire
for an answer on a given topic (Kruglanksi 1990). Professional skepticism represents the
propensity of a person to wait in making a conclusion until the evidence provides enough support
for one explanation over other explanations (Hurtt 2010). Tone at the top describes the ethical
environment that is created by a company’s managers.
While numerous studies have examined the professional skepticism of auditors in the
accounting literature, only one study has investigated auditors’ dispositional need for closure. In
her 2003 speech to the American Accounting Association, Jeanette Franzel, a Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) board member, mentions how audit regulators are
concerned that the high rate of audit deficiencies observed during inspections is related to a lack
of professional skepticism.1 Since a high dispositional need for closure has been shown to
negatively affect the generation of auditors’ hypotheses (Bailey, Daily, and Phillips 2011), need
1

http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/08052013_AAA.aspx
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for closure may be an important understudied antecedent to skeptical judgment. In fact, when
Hurtt (2010) asked professional accountants what comprises professional skepticism and what is
believed to be its opposite, their comments on the opposite of suspension of judgment lead her to
identify Kruglanski’s (1990) Need for Cognitive Closure scale as one to examine for her scale’s
initial sample item pool. The purpose of my study is to examine how the behavioral
characteristics (professional skepticism and need for closure) of internal auditors in conjunction
with an environmental characteristic (chief audit executive emphasis on professional skepticism)
affect their fraud risk assessment and audit procedures.
The examination of whether professional skepticism, need for closure, and chief audit
executive influence affect internal auditors’ fraud risk assessment is important for a couple of
reasons. First, regulators in the auditing profession are focusing on improving audit quality,
while there is a lack of research investigating the professional skepticism of internal auditors.
Several auditing organizations, including the Global Public Policy Committee (consisting of
BDO, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and the
PCAOB have recently issued guidance on how to enhance professional skepticism. In 2012, the
Center for Audit Quality, National Association of Corporate Directors, Financial Executives
International and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) released a series of webinars
highlighting the importance of professional skepticism in the financial reporting supply chain.
The main focus on the professional skepticism of external auditors presents a problem because,
in order to truly enhance overall audit quality, all auditors should exhibit professional skepticism
while evaluating audit evidence. Second, the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) has identified
antecedents to professional skepticism as one of its areas of interest for its 2015 Request for
Proposals for Academic Research in Auditing. This initiative by the CAQ encourages academic

43

research on topics of interest to the auditing profession and provides grants and professional
participants to researchers. There is a lack of empirical evidence showing how the need for
closure affects auditors’ judgment process. The results of this study will provide more insight
about a personality factor that may affect fraud risk assessment and will assist companies and
audit regulators in their efforts to enhance professional skepticism and improve fraud detection.
The results of this study will contribute to the literature in a few ways. First, this study
answers Nelson’s (2009) call to assess the structural form of his professional skepticism model
by examining how incentives and traits interact in their effects on skeptical judgment and action.
Second, although professional skepticism is not a requirement for internal auditors, the lack of
research in this area prevents the uncovering of a key characteristic that may affect the judgment
process of internal auditors who contribute to the overall financial reporting process. In fact, the
Center for Audit Quality has identified professional skepticism as one of seven risk areas for the
2014 audit cycle. There is also little empirical evidence examining the factors that affect the
fraud risk assessment judgments of internal auditors who are an integral part of their corporate
governance function. Gaining such insight into the internal auditing process will contribute to the
literature because there is a heightened focus on audit quality in the accounting profession which
impacts the coordination between external and internal auditors. Not only will this study shed
light on personality and environmental factors that affect internal audit quality but it will also
provide an interdisciplinary perspective by drawing upon the accounting, management, and
psychology literatures. Finally, Carpenter and Reimers (2013) find that an audit partner’s
emphasis on professional skepticism does effect external auditors’ fraud risk assessments and
this study provides an extension to their study by examining the internal audit setting and an
additional personality trait. The results of this study will be useful to regulators, audit
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committees, boards of directors, chief audit executives, corporate managers, and external
auditors.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Internal Auditors and Fraud Risk Assessment
Auditing standards discuss auditors’ responsibilities in assessing the risks of material
misstatement due to fraud. Fraud research describes fraud as requiring three components:
incentive, opportunity, and attitude (Cressey 1973, Albrecht, Howe, and Romney 1984,
Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham 1989, Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, and Velury 2008). First, a
person has motivation or pressure to commit fraud. For example, a company executive may be
under extreme pressure to meet an earnings target. Second, the person’s environment allows for
fraud to be carried out. For example, the internal controls in the organization may be weak with
little management oversight. Finally, a person can find many rationalizations for committing
fraud. For example, a company manager may believe that fudging accounting numbers will not
hurt anyone.
Moreover, Power (2013, 525) proposes that fraud risk is an apparatus comprised of “…a
diverse network of elements – rules, ideas, roles, procedures, routines, texts – focused on risk,
control systems and managerial responsibility.” Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (AU
Section 316) provides specific examples of fraud risk factors that auditors should assess while
conducting a financial statement audit (AICPA 2002). Some specific examples of fraud risk
factors are: a high degree of competition or market saturation (incentive), a complex or unstable
organizational structure (opportunity), and ineffective communication of the entity’s ethical
standards by management (attitude) (AICPA 2002). SAS No. 99 also states that two types of
fraud should be considered, both misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting and
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misstatements due to the misappropriation of assets (AICPA 2002). The standard also requires
auditors to: have brainstorming sessions to discuss the potential for fraud, gather information
necessary to identify fraud risks, evaluate a company’s programs and controls, and document the
fraud risk assessment process.
Similar to external auditing standards, the International Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards) specifically outline internal auditors’ responsibilities
related to fraud (IIA 2012). First, IIA Standard 1200: Proficiency and Due Professional Care
states that internal auditors must possess sufficient knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud and
the way it is managed by the organization (IIA 2012). Second, IIA Standard 1220: Due
Professional Care mentions that internal auditors must exercise due professional care by
considering the probability of fraud (IIA 2012). Third, IIA Standard 2060: Reporting to the
Senior Management and the Board discusses how the Chief Audit Executive’s report to senior
management and the board must include significant risk exposures and control issues, including
fraud risks. Fourth, IIA Standard 2120: Risk Management (2012) explicitly states that internal
auditors “must evaluate the potential for the occurrence of fraud and how the organization
manages fraud risk.” Fifth, IIA Standard 2210: Engagement Objectives asserts that internal
auditors must consider the probability of fraud during the development of engagement
objectives. Furthermore, the International Professional Practices Framework - Practice Guide
(IPPF Guide) titled “Internal Auditing and Fraud” describes how internal auditors play an
important role in fraud risk management due to their close knowledge of how their organizations
work (IIA 2009). The practice guide also notes that if internal auditors exercise professional
skepticism, then they are more likely to notice the characteristics of fraud (IIA 2009). In
summary, as companies evolve and their transactions become more complex, the role of internal
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auditors as internal mechanisms of corporate governance has also expanded and so have their
responsibilities for assessing fraud risk.
Hillison, Pacini, and Sinason (1999) mention how the internal auditor is the one
employee within the company that can serve as the main line of defense against fraud. Thus, a
closer examination into factors that affect the fraud risk assessments of internal auditors is
warranted. Gramling and Myers (2003) find that internal auditors attach the same level of
importance to fraud warning signs as external auditors. Fullerton and Durtschi (2004) provide
evidence that internal auditors with high levels of professional skepticism exhibit a higher degree
for information search when confronted with more fraud symptoms. In testing internal auditors’
perceived responsibility for detecting fraud and accountability effects, DeZoort and Harrison
(2008) illustrate that internal auditors report moderate levels of responsibility for fraud detection,
with accountable participants feeling more responsible for fraud detection than anonymous
participants. Norman, Rose, and Rose (2010) document how perceived threats result in internal
auditors reducing assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee in
comparison with reporting to management. The authors also compare their sample of internal
auditors to a sample of external auditors (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004) regarding the
decomposition of fraud risk assessments, where decomposition leads to increased attention to
management attitude cues for internal auditors but increased attention to opportunity and
incentive cues for external auditors (Norman, Rose and Rose 2010).
Most recently, Carpenter, Reimers, and Fretwell (2011) find that internal auditors who
brainstorm in groups identify fewer fraud risks than groups of individual internal auditors
(nominal groups), brainstorming groups identify more quality fraud risks than nominal groups,
and internal auditors who assess risk qualitatively provide higher fraud risk assessments than
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those assessing risk quantitatively. Burnaby, Howe, and Muehlmann (2011) document that
skepticism, risk assessment, and recognizing fraud opportunities are identified by internal
auditors as being the most effective skills needed to detect top fraud risks. However, an article in
the Internal Auditor magazine (Ratley and Snell 2014, 70) reveals that “…only about 10 percent
of frauds committed by executives are uncovered by internal auditor, which shows that many
warning signs of fraud are being missed.” Also, in its Report to the Nations on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study, the ACFE notes that 74% of survey participants
indicate that an internal audit department was in place when fraud occurred at their organizations
(ACFE 2016).
Professional Skepticism
Professional skepticism has numerous definitions. AU Section 230.07 defines it as “an
attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of the audit evidence”
(PCAOB 2002). The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) states that “skepticism
means the auditor makes a critical assessment, with a questioning mind, of the validity of audit
evidence obtained and is alert to audit evidence that contradicts or brings into question the
reliability of documents and responses to inquiries and other information obtained from
management and those charged with governance” (2006). Previous studies view professional
skepticism as the opposite of trust (Shaub 1996, Shaub and Lawrence 1996 and
1999, Choo and Tan 2000, Quadackers 2007, Cohen, Dalton, and Harp 2014, and Quadackers,
Groot and Wright 2014). Another definition describes professional skepticism as “…a
heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information
available to the auditor” (Nelson 2009).
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Hurtt defines professional skepticism from a different viewpoint by stating that it is “the
propensity of an individual to defer concluding until the evidence provides sufficient support for
one alternative/explanation over others” (2010). Hurtt, Brown-Liburd, Earley, and
Krishnamoorthy (2013) develop a professional skepticism framework that is based on skeptical
judgment and skeptical action, which are the two foundational components of Nelson’s (2009)
model. “Skeptical judgment occurs when an auditor recognizes that a potential issue may exist
and that more work or effort is necessary. Skeptical action occurs when an auditor changes
his/her behavior based on the skeptical judgment” (Hurtt et al. 2013). Lastly, Nolder and Kadous
(2014) propose a framework that conceptualizes professional skepticism as an attitude and
incorporates an affective component as the third measure of professional skepticism.
Nelson’s (2009, 1) definition of professional skepticism reflects a presumptive doubt
perspective which implies that auditors who possess high professional skepticism need more
persuasive evidence “in terms of quality and/or quantity” in order to be convinced that an
assertion is correct. Nelson (2009) also presents a model that demonstrates how auditor
judgments are produced by combining audit evidence (or evidential input) with auditor
knowledge, traits, and incentives. The model then describes how auditor actions are produced by
combining auditor judgments (that reflect some level of professional skepticism) with auditor
knowledge, traits, and incentives (Nelson 2009). The Nelson model also notes that professional
skepticism is a product of auditor judgment, but because it is revealed through skeptical
behavior, it is an attribute of auditor performance (2009). Building upon the Nelson model, Hurtt
et al. (2013) propose a skepticism framework that includes the four antecedents of auditor
characteristics, evidence characteristics, client characteristics, and environmental characteristics.
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The current study examines the auditor characteristics of professional skepticism and
need for closure, and the environmental characteristic of the chief audit executive’s emphasis on
professional skepticism. Auditor characteristics that influence skeptical judgment include
individual differences (traits), motivation, moral reasoning, and affect. Environmental
characteristics that influence auditor professional skepticism include regulations, standards, the
control environment, accountability to other stakeholders (e.g. reviewers and regulators), legal
liability, and incentives to skeptical action. The auditor characteristics that will be investigated in
this study are professional skepticism and need for closure (individual differences/traits). The
environmental characteristic in this study is the chief audit executive’s emphasis on professional
skepticism (incentives to skeptical action). Additionally, information search will be measured as
a skeptical action (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004 and Hurtt et al. 2013).
Even though there is no specific requirement in the IIA standards for internal auditors to
exercise professional skepticism, they should apply skepticism in their role as a key stakeholder
in the financial reporting process. Richard Chambers, President and CEO of the IIA, mentions
how internal auditors are trained to exercise professional skepticism (Chambers 2014). IIA
Standard 1120: Individual Objectivity points out that internal auditors must have an impartial and
unbiased attitude which is consistent with the neutral perspective of professional skepticism (IIA
2012). Cushing (2000) discusses how auditors’ beliefs should not be biased in either a positive or
negative way. Nelson (2009) observes how auditing standards (SAS No. 1, International
Standard on Auditing 200.15–16, Auditing Standard No. 2) foster the “neutral” view of
skepticism by requiring auditors to avoid any bias in management representations, ex ante.
Previous studies (Cohen, Dalton, and Harp 2014 and Quadackers, Groot, and Wright 2014) use
the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale (HPSS; Hurtt 2010) to measure auditors’ neutrality;
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therefore the HPSS (see Appendix C) will be used to measure the professional skepticism of
internal auditors in this study. Hurtt (2010) suggests that professional skepticism is a multidimensional individual characteristic and develops a 30-item professional skepticism scale to ex
ante measure an individual’s level of trait professional skepticism. The six characteristics
measured by the HPSS include a questioning mind, a suspension of judgment, a search for
knowledge, interpersonal understanding, self-esteem, and autonomy. Hurtt (2010) documents
that her sample of 200 auditors from a major international auditing firm score a mean of 138.6 on
the HPSS, which ranges from 30 to 180. The internal consistency coefficient using Cronbach’s
alpha is 0.862, while the test-retest reliability correlation between first and second HPSS scores is
0.85 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level (Hurtt 2010). One study that examines the effect
of internal auditors’ professional skepticism on fraud detection notes that the mean response to
every fraud symptom sub-category for expanding information search is higher for individuals
classified as high skeptics than those classified as low skeptics, which validates the HPSS
(Fullerton and Durtschi 2004).
Need for Closure
The need for cognitive closure (NCC) is defined as the desire for any answer on a
specific topic as opposed to confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski 1990). It relates to a person’s
motivation in regard to information processing and judgment (Webster and Kruglanski 1994).
Since closure involves predictability and a basis for action, NCC arises when predictability or
action is important. NCC is based on the theory of lay epistemics, a psychological theory that
describes individuals’ knowledge acquisition process (Kruglanski 1989). This theory proposes
that an individual’s search for knowledge consists of a process in which a problem is formed and
ultimately resolved. Kruglanski (1989) goes on to describe how an individual’s motivation for
2

DeVellis (1991) states that a Cronbach’s alpha between .80 and .90 is very good.
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acquiring knowledge must also be considered. First, he states that motivations can be categorized
as closure seeking versus avoidance, and specificity versus nonspecificity (Kruglanski 1989).
Second, Kruglanski (1989) delineates how closure seeking can be divided into the need for
nonspecific closure and the need for specific closure. The need for nonspecific closure is “… the
desire for a definite answer on some topic…,” while the need for specific closure is categorized
as the desire for a particular answer on some topic (Kruglanski 1989, 14). Despite the fact that
the need for closure may depend on situational factors, Kruglanski (1989) notes that the need for
closure can be a trait. The trait of nonspecific closure seeking motivation will be examined in
this study as the need for cognitive closure.
Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem (1993) present an instrument to measure NCC. Like
professional skepticism, the NCC is also a multi-dimensional trait. The Need for Closure Scale
(NFCS, see Appendix C) identifies five different aspects to represent the NCC latent variable:
order, predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity, and closed-mindedness (Webster and Kruglanski
1994).3 The NFCS is a 42-item scale with each item reflecting a 6-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 for strongly disagree to 6 for strongly agree (Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem 1993).4
Respondents’ composite need for closure is obtained by summing each of the individual items.
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) test the NFCS, reporting on its discriminant validation against
other personality measures and investigating its relation to other cognitive measures. In one
3

Order represents the fact that people with a high need for closure desire order and structure but despise
chaos and disorder. One example of an order statement is “I think that having clear rules and order at
work is essential for success” (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Predictability involves the consistency of
secure knowledge regarding future events. Decisiveness relates to the urgent longing to reach closure in
judgments and choices. An example of one of the decisiveness statements is “I usually make important
decisions quickly and confidently” (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Ambiguity reflects the absence of
closure. Closed-mindedness is defined as an unwillingness to have one’s knowledge confronted by
different opinions or opposing evidence.
4

A shorter 15-item NFCS revised by Roets and Van Hiel (2011) will be administered to participants in
this study.
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experiment conducted on a sample of students and library adult patrons, the authors find that the
NFCS has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84 for both samples), and high testretest reliability (r=0.86 for the students) (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). The authors confirm
the NFCS’s construct validity by highlighting that although need for closure has low to moderate
associations with other personality measures (including authoritarianism, intolerance for
ambiguity, need for cognition, impulsivity, and need for structure), it remains distinct from these
constructs (Webster and Kruglanski 1994).
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) also examine the theory of careers (Holland 1985) and, as
predicted, find that accounting majors (with an average composite score of 173) possess a higher
dispositional need for closure than studio-art majors (with an average composite score of 139).
Bailey, Daily, and Phillips (2011) document that professional auditors have a lower dispositional
need for closure (DNFC, with an overall mean of 156) than the sample of accounting students
investigated in Webster and Kruglanski (1994). They also observe that auditors who are higher
in DNFC generate, fewer and lower quality, hypotheses but have greater confidence in their
generated hypotheses (Bailey, Daily, and Phillips 2011). Examination of this trait is important
since prior studies have shown conflicting evidence regarding professional skepticism. For
example, Carpenter and Reimers (2013) highlight that even though a partner’s emphasis on
professional skepticism positively affects auditors’ fraud risk assessments, it does not influence
their professional skepticism trait. More specifically, Peytcheva (2014) finds that professional
skepticism is a significant predictor of cognitive performance in a sample of students but not for
a sample of practicing auditors. Also, Fay and Montague (2015) discuss how rush-to-solve bias
is one of the hidden biases that can affect auditing decisions, including the evaluation of the
likelihood of fraud. This bias is similar to the NCC in that auditors form a judgment without
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considering all of the available information. Therefore, it is essential to examine another
personality trait, in this case the need for cognitive closure, that may affect internal auditors’
fraud risk assessments and audit procedures. Furthermore, Donnelly, Quirin, and O’Bryan (2003)
discuss how the gathering of insufficient evidence is an example of dysfunctional behavior by
auditors. The NCC may provide an alternative explanation for auditors’ dysfunctional behavior
and/or seeming lack of professional skepticism.
Tone at the Top
“Tone at the top” reflects the belief that management should model the behavior that is
expected of employees. The aforementioned IPPF Guide notes that an effective fraud
management program includes appropriate tone at the top from senior managers (IIA 2009).
Internal auditors report to the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), who has overall responsibility for
the internal audit department. CAEs play an important role in setting the tone at the top for
internal auditors because they are responsible for establishing the risk-based plan that determines
the priorities of the internal audit activity and reporting significant fraud risks to senior
management and the board (IIA 2012). Psychology research proposes that individuals will adopt
the position that they expect will gain favor with the person to whom they are accountable when
they know the views of that person prior to forming an opinion (Tetlock and Lerner 1999).
Gramling (1999) operationalizes audit partner preferences as a specified preference for: (1)
efficiency and profitability, or (2) audit quality and professional skepticism. Thus, in the internal
auditing setting, if CAEs emphasize professional skepticism to their internal auditors, it is
expected that the internal auditors will exhibit professional skepticism. On the other hand, if
CAEs emphasize efficiency of the audits over effectiveness, it is expected that internal auditors
will work expeditiously to complete audits possibly minimizing their skepticism. Norman, Rose,
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and Rose (2010) document evidence that internal audit reporting lines (either directly to
management or the audit committee) affect internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments. Therefore,
this study will investigate whether the CAE’s influence affects the judgment making process of
internal auditors.
Prior corporate governance literature about CAEs provides insight about their tolerance
for financial misstatements (Norman, Rose, and Suh 2011), perceptions of the most important
performance attributes of internal auditors (Abdolmohammadi 2012), and evaluations of whistleblowing allegations (Guthrie, Norman, and Rose 2012); but it has not examined their
consideration of professional skepticism in relation to the internal audit function. Previous
external auditing research has provided evidence that audit partner’s views influence their
subordinates’ decisions related to analytical reviews (Peecher 1996), client bidding (Cohen and
Trompeter 1998), reliance on internal auditors (Gramling 1999), accounts receivable
collectability reviews (Turner 2001), going concern judgments (Wilks 2002), audit planning
decisions (Bierstaker and Wright 2001, 2005), and fraud risk assessments (Carpenter and
Reimers 2013). Hernandez and Groot (2007) also highlight the importance of senior
management attitudes in relation to auditors’ fraud risk assessments. Additionally, Cohen,
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2007) find that external auditors consider the role of the board of
directors when making decisions about risk assessments and audit program planning. This paper
extends the Carpenter and Reimers’ (2013) study by examining how the CAE’s emphasis on
professional skepticism influences internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments in light of the issue
revealed by Norman, Rose, and Rose’s (2010) note that conclusions about internal auditors’
judgment processes should not be drawn from external auditor studies.
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Hypothesis Development
Personality traits and environmental factors have been shown in the accounting literature
to affect the skeptical judgments and actions of auditors (Nelson 2009, Carpenter and Reimers
2013, and Hurtt et al. 2013). This study investigates the joint effects of two personality traits and
one environmental factor on auditors’ skeptical judgments and actions. The traits are
professional skepticism and need for closure. The environmental factor is CAE emphasis on
professional skepticism. If the CAE’s emphasis on professional skepticism (i.e., high or low
emphasis), the auditors’ trait professional skepticism, and need for closure are factors that
influence internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments and information search, the mechanism should
be consistent with the model in Figure 5, based on the most current conceptualization of
moderated mediated effects (Hayes 2013). The CAE emphasis on professional skepticism will be
manipulated as either high (with a focus on effective audits) or low (with a focus on efficient
audits) following Carpenter and Reimers (2013). In their study, it is noted that upper
management’s degree of emphasis on professional skepticism is an essential aspect of proper
tone at the top which is communicated through emphasis on effectiveness versus efficiency
(Carpenter and Reimers 2013). Therefore, upper management’s focus on effectiveness is
operationalized as high CAE emphasis on professional skepticism, whereas a focus on efficiency
is operationalized as low CAE emphasis on professional skepticism.
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*Modified from Hayes, A. 2013. Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A
Regression-based Approach. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Notes:
X is the causal variable, W and Z are the moderators, M is the mediator, and Y is the outcome.
a, b, and c are the regression coefficients in the estimation models M and Y; and 𝑒𝑀 and 𝑒𝑌 are
errors in the estimates of M and Y, respectively.
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The conditional indirect effect of X on Y through M = (𝑎1 + 𝑎4 𝑊 + 𝑎5 𝑍) (𝑏1 + 𝑏9 𝑊 + 𝑏10 𝑍).
The direct effect of X on Y is 𝑐′1 .
The names of the constructs and variables in the current study are inserted in italics (modified
from Hayes 2013, 454).
The hypotheses are inserted in the dashed boxes.
Previous literature provides empirical evidence confirming the link between fraud risk
assessments and audit testing (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009, Brazel, Carpenter, and Jenkins
2010, Hammersley, Bamber, and Carpenter 2010, and Carpenter, Reimers, and Fretwell 2011).
As mentioned above, prior research has shown that management’s views influence both fraud
risk assessments (Carpenter and Reimers 2013) and audit planning decisions (Bierstaker and
Wright 2001, 2005). This leads to the following set of hypotheses:
H1(a): CAE emphasis on professional skepticism (versus efficiency) increases
the extent of internal auditors’ information search through its
effect on fraud risk assessments.
Although the other links in the mediation model (links a and b in Figure 5) are of interest
(and supported by theory as noted above), they do not need to be significant in order to support
H1a (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007 and Hayes 2013). The ultimate goal of the mediation
model is to investigate whether CAE emphasis on professional skepticism influences fraud risk
assessments (as moderated by the individual traits of professional skepticism and need for
closure) that result in an increased information search. Hypotheses about these intermediate links
are included for completeness:
H1(b): CAE emphasis on professional skepticism (versus efficiency) increases
internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments.
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H1(c): Higher fraud risk assessments increase the extent of internal auditors’
information search.
It is possible that high or low CAE emphasis on professional skepticism could increase or
decrease the extent of internal auditors’ information search without the mediation effect of fraud
risk assessments. For example, Carpenter and Reimers (2013) illustrate that audit partner
emphasis on professional skepticism significantly influences external auditors’ skeptical actions.
Therefore, in the internal auditing setting, high CAE emphasis on professional skepticism is
expected to increase the extent of internal auditors’ information search. This leads to the
following hypothesis, concerning link c’ of the model:
H2: CAE emphasis on professional skepticism has a direct positive effect on the
extent of internal auditors’ information search, over-and-above any effect
being mediated by fraud risk assessments.
Additionally, the moderated effects are of interest in this study, therefore hypotheses for
these effects are stated as follows:
In regard to fraud risk assessment, prior auditing research provides evidence that personality
traits affect the judgment processes of auditors. For example, Gul (1984) discusses the effect of
personality and cognitive style variables on accounting decision-making relationships. Wright
and Davidson (2000) provide evidence that tolerance for ambiguity (another psychological
characteristic) affects the risk assessment judgment of commercial loan officers. Also, many
previous studies have examined how personality traits influence auditors’ risk assessments. More
specifically, Carpenter, Durtschi, and Gaynor (2011) use fraud risk assessments as an indication
of skepticism. In regard to information search, Fullerton and Durtschi (2004) find that internal
auditors are more likely to expand their information search when they have a higher Hurtt score.

59

A search for knowledge (e.g. gathering more audit evidence) is one characteristic of professional
skepticism (Hurtt 2010). Hurtt et al. (2012) show that more skeptical auditors exhibit higher
levels of evidence assessment. However, Konnikova (2013, 1) discusses the theory of cognitive
closure and how a heightened need for closure leads people “to produce fewer hypotheses and
search less thoroughly for information.” The contrast between these two traits leads to the
following set of hypotheses:
H3(a): As internal auditors' professional skepticism increases, the relationship
between CAE emphasis on professional skepticism and fraud risk
assessments increases.
H3(b): As internal auditors' need for closure increases, the relationship between
CAE emphasis on professional skepticism and fraud risk assessments
decreases.
H4(a): As internal auditors' professional skepticism increases, the relationship
between fraud risk assessments and the extent of information search
increases.
H4(b): As internal auditors' need for closure increases, the relationship between
fraud risk assessments and the extent of information search decreases.
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD
Participants
The target number of participants is 100 internal auditors. Survey questionnaires (see
Appendix C) will be emailed to potential participants. The survey participants will span a few
geographic locations (Los Angeles and other cities), have sufficient work experience, and
represent different industries in order to obtain generalizable survey results. Additionally, I
expect to perform pilot testing with at least five internal auditors.
Research Design
CAE emphasis on professional skepticism is manipulated as high or low (see Appendix
C). Adapting Carpenter and Reimers (2013), high CAE emphasis on professional skepticism
focuses on effectiveness, while low CAE emphasis on professional skepticism focuses on
efficiency. The participants will be randomly assigned to one of the two treatment conditions
(either high or low CAE emphasis on professional skepticism). For the first stage of the study,
participants will read case materials of a company’s financial information (see Appendix C) and
rate the likelihood of fraud on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 = low and 7 = high5,
adapting Norman et al. [2010]) based on the information set. Then, participants will be asked to
indicate the extent that they would expand their search for information related to audit testing if
they observed the specified situation [on an eight-point Likert scale with 0 = not at all and 7 = to
an extremely large extent, adapting Fullerton and Durtschi (2004)]. The participant’s answer to
this question is the dependent variable. The second stage of the study will be an initial
assessment of the internal auditors’ professional skepticism and need for closure, in which
participants will complete the HPSS (see Appendix C) and NFCS (see Appendix C). Following
Hurtt (2010), participants will be informed only that the scales are designed to measure personal
5

Eutsler and Lang (2015) find that setting scale lengths at 7 points maximizes variance.
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characteristics and that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions. The two scales
should take participants 15 minutes or less to complete.
After the administration of the experiment, each participant will be asked a manipulation
check question, and demographic questions including years of experience, position, gender, etc.
The total administration time of the experiment is expected to be less than 30 minutes.
Independent, Mediating, and Moderating Variables
As illustrated in Figure 5, CAE emphasis on professional skepticism is the independent
variable. CAE emphasis on professional skepticism is manipulated as either high or low. As
expressed in Hypothesis 1, the mediating variable is fraud risk assessment. As expressed in
Hypotheses 3 and 4, the moderating variables are professional skepticism and need for closure.
As discussed above, participants will be asked to assess fraud risk on an eleven-point Likert scale
where 0 = the lowest likelihood for fraud and 10 = the highest likelihood for fraud. The first
moderating variable, professional skepticism will be measured using the HPSS (Hurtt 2010)
which is well established in the accounting literature. The second moderating variable, need for
closure, will be measured using the NCFS (Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem 1993) which has
been substantiated by numerous psychology studies. Finally, the fraud risk assessments and
information search ratings of high and low skeptics, and high and low need for closure
participants will be compared. Covariates are experience, gender, and age based on previous
studies with internal auditor samples (Fullerton and Durtschi 2004; Norman, Rose, and Rose
2010).
Manipulation Check
Participants will be asked one question regarding the CAE emphasis condition of their
respective treatment. They will be asked whether the CAE emphasizes that the internal audit be
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completed as effectively as possible with a sufficient level of professional skepticism or
efficiently as possible with an awareness of the associated costs.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Survey Instrument for Chapter 1
(Adapted from DeZoort and Harrison 2008 and Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose 2010)

Study of Internal Auditors
This questionnaire is part of a study that is being carried out by a researcher at the
University of Memphis. The study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Memphis. The University of Memphis does not have any funds budgeted for
compensation for injury, damages, or other expenses.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the fraud risk assessments made by internal
auditors. I am requesting that you analyze the information provided in the following pages and
provide your judgments, as you would in the normal course of business. I have limited the
amount of information presented to lower the time necessary to complete the study. Although you
will not have all of the information you would typically have at your disposal, it is important that
you make your judgments to the best of your abilities given the limited information set.
Your participation in this study is valuable to the advancement of research on internal
auditor practices. Please answer all questions carefully in the order presented. The
questionnaire should take less than 20 minutes to complete. There is no more than minimal risk
associated with this research. Your responses are completely confidential and cannot be traced
to you or your company.
If you have any questions or comments, you may contact me at: pthmsqnn@memphis.edu
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If you would like a summary of the study results, please e-mail me and I will send a copy as soon
as the results are tabulated.
You may also contact the faculty advisor for this study, Dr. Charles Bailey, with questions at
cbailey2@memphis.edu
For questions about your rights, you may contact The Institutional Review Board at the
University of Memphis via e-mail at irb@memphis.edu
Thank you for your help. At the conclusion of the survey, you will have the opportunity to
enter a drawing for a $100 Amazon e-gift card!
Porschia Nkansa, CPA
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may discontinue at any time.
Incomplete surveys will be deleted from the survey database.
Are there any benefits to you or others?
If you participate in this study, you can expect to provide meaningful data and information to
accounting researchers in higher education, IIA members, and other auditing practitioners. We
cannot promise you that you will receive any or all of the benefits described.
Any data obtained in connection with his study will remain anonymous.
We will protect your privacy and the data you provide by ensuring that the web server does not
collect email or IP addresses. Qualtrics uses SSL for secure collection and transmission of data
and responses are transmitted over a secure, encrypted connection. Information collected through
your participation may be used to fulfill an educational requirement, published in scholarly
journals, or presented at professional meetings.
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If you consent to participating in this study (and that you are over 18 years of age), please
click the “>>” button. If you do not consent, please close this window.

When reading the case materials and responding to the questions, please make the
following assumptions:
1. Assume that you currently serve as an internal auditor for High Quality Tools, Inc. (HQT) and
that the internal audit function is not outsourced.
[For reviewers: the manipulation of the level of coordination with the external auditor is
included in the assumption below]
2. Assume that the external auditor asks for your direct assistance in performing tests of controls
over cash and accounts receivable. The external auditor will supervise, review, and evaluate your
work as well as hold weekly meetings with you. [Assume that the external auditor will be
relying on work that you have already performed for testing controls over cash and accounts
receivable. The external auditor requests access to your working papers.]
I. Background
Introduction
HQT is a tool manufacturer that sells to distributors and select retailers. HQT is a publicly-held
firm and must file annual reports with governmental regulators. The company has had stable
financial health and growth. Prior year results and current year planning indicate that HQT has
effective internal controls and competent management and directors. The internal audit
department, of which you are a member, has a good reputation.
Summary (Unaudited) 2014 Annual Financial Information
Revenues

US $13 million
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Pretax Income

US $1.4 million

Net Income

US $1.0 million

EPS

US $1.05/share (forecast $1.04/share)

A/R (net)

US $1.0 million

Inventory

US $2.8 million

Current Assets

US $4.7 million

PP&E (net)

US $3.9 million

Total Assets

US $10.5 million

Current Liabilities

US $2.0 million

Total Liabilities

US $5.6 million

Total Equity

US $4.9 million

II. Fraud Risk Checklist
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 includes a checklist of 40 red flags that may indicate
risks of fraud. Below are HQT business characteristics noted by the internal audit function for
2014:
[For reviewers: the following 6 cues were presented to participants in the low fraud risk
manipulation]


Low degree of competition or market saturation.



Insignificant declines in customer demand and decreasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy.



Little need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive-including
financing of major research and development or capital expenditures.



Moderate ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
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Low vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence,
or interest rates.



Insignificant amount of operations located or conducted across international borders
where differing business environments and cultures exist.

[For reviewers: the following 6 cues were presented to participants in the high fraud risk
manipulation]


High degree of competition or market saturation.



Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy.



Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive-including financing
of major research and development or capital expenditures.



Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.



High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product
obsolescence, or interest rates.



Significant operations located or conducted across international borders where differing
business environments and cultures exist.

[For reviewers: the manipulation of the level of coordination with the external auditor is
repeated in the sentence below]
The external auditor asks for your direct assistance in performing tests of controls over cash and
accounts receivable. The external auditor will supervise, review, and evaluate your work as well
as hold weekly meetings with you. [will be relying on work that you have already performed for
testing controls over cash and accounts receivable. The external auditor requests access to your
working papers.]:
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What do you believe is the overall risk of financial statement fraud for HQT?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Low

Moderate

High

Risk

Risk

Risk

Indicate how many hours you want to budget this year for substantive testing the cash and
accounts receivable accounts.
Budgeted hours in 2014: ________ hours
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Professional Skepticism Scale (Hurtt 2010)
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Demographic Information

1. Gender:

Female

Male

2. Age: ______
3. Do you have the following certifications?
Certified Fraud Examiner

Yes

No

Certified Internal Auditor

Yes

No

Certified Public Accountant

Yes

No

Certified Management Accountant

Yes

No

4. Are you a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors?

Yes

No

5. Years of internal audit experience: _____
6. Years of external audit experience: _____
7. Have you ever evaluated fraud risk prior to completing this case?
Yes

No

8. Highest college degree:

Bachelor

Graduate

9. Your current position:
Internal Audit (non-outsourced)

Internal Audit (outsourced)

10. In what type of industry do you work?
Banking
Casino and Gaming
Finance and Insurance
Government
Healthcare
Higher Education
Manufacturing
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Other _________

Professional Services
Real Estate
Shipping
Technology
Other
11. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding your position (check
one)?
I was an internal audit member, and the internal audit function was not outsourced.
I was a member of an outsourced internal audit function.
12. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding the external auditor
in this task (check one):
_____ The external auditor will be relying on work that you have already performed for testing
controls over cash and accounts receivable. The external auditor requests access to your working
papers.
_____ The external auditor asks for your direct assistance in performing tests of controls over
cash and accounts receivable. The external auditor will supervise, review, and evaluate your
work as well as hold weekly meetings with you.
13. If you would like to be entered in the drawing for a $100 Amazon e-gift card, please
enter your email address:

Thank you very much for your help!
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APPENDIX B
Survey Instrument for Chapter 2
(Adapted from Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose 2010;
Langstraat, Coyne, and Willis 2015)

Study of Internal Auditors
This questionnaire is part of a study designed to investigate the decisions made by
internal auditors. I am requesting that you analyze the information provided in the following
pages and provide your judgments, as you would in the normal course of business. I have limited
the amount of information presented to limit the time necessary to complete the study. Although
you will not have all of the information you would typically have at your disposal, it is important
that you make your judgments to the best of your abilities given the limited information set.
Your participation in this study is valuable to the advancement of research on internal
auditors. Please answer all questions carefully in the order presented. The questionnaire should
take less than 20 minutes to complete. Your responses are completely confidential and cannot be
traced to you or your company. If you would like a summary of the study results, please e-mail
pthmsqnn@memphis.edu and I will send a copy as soon as the results are tabulated.
Thank you for your help.
Porschia Nkansa, CPA
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When reading the case materials and responding to the questions, please make the
following assumptions:
1. Assume that you currently serve as an internal auditor for ABC Industries and that the internal
audit function is not outsourced.
Background
You are an internal auditor with an organization that is a primary contractor for the U.S.
Government. You recently completed an audit of a subsidiary business unit of ABC Industries
which completes significant (large dollar) contracts for various government agencies. The audit
was requested after the subsidiary was indicted on multiple counts of fraudulent billing practices
while performing work under its government contracts. The subsidiary altered employee time
cards to transfer labor costs from fixed cost contracts to government contracts.
The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government to receive reimbursement from
private companies whose false statements have resulted in an abuse of government funds.
Companies that make payments to the government for FCA violations have two options for the
tax treatment of these payments. Payments that reimburse the government for losses are
classified as compensatory damages, while payments that are for punishment are classified as
punitive damages. Federal law states that compensatory damages are a legitimate deductible
business expense, whereas punitive damages are not.
ABC Industries’ total civil claim settlement was $2 million and the company deducted
this payment to the government for the previous tax year. ABC Industries is a mid-size company
with $10 million in annual revenue.1 However, you notice that a tax staff member footnoted that

According to the Ohio State University’s National Center for the Middle Market, mid-sized companies
are defined as having between $10 million to $1 billion in annual revenue in 2015.
http://www.middlemarketcenter.org/infographics/4q-2015-middle-market-indicator-infographic
1
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$1.5 million of the false invoices were compensatory damages and the remaining $500,000
should have been recorded as punitive damages.
Should you include this finding in your internal audit report to management?
3

2

1

Definitely

0

1

2

Neutral

3
Definitely

Should Include

Should Not Include

[For reviewers: the following sentence is for the “legal conflict” control group]
ABC Industries’ legal counsel has requested that you not disclose this finding about the
payments being classified as compensatory and partially punitive because it may harm ABC
Industries’ False Claims Act appeal (a Circuit Court ruled that the $500,000 difference is
nondeductible).
[For reviewers: the following sentence is for the “no legal conflict” control group]
You have a good working relationship with ABC Industries’ legal counsel. The legal counsel has
reviewed ABC Industries’ deduction payment to the government for the previous tax year and
the tax staff member’s footnote. Legal counsel is in agreement with the tax staff member’s
footnote.
[In light of the pushback from legal counsel,] would you include the finding in your
internal audit report to management?
3
Definitely

2

1

0

1

Neutral

Would Include

2

3
Definitely
Would Not Include
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Professional Skepticism Scale (Hurtt 2010)

88
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Professional Moral Courage Scale (Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo 2009)
Please read each item and indicate to what extent it pertains to you at work. Use the following
scale: 1 = “never true,” 4 = “sometimes,” and 7 = “always true.”
Theme 1: moral agency
_____ 1. I am the type of person who is unfailing when it comes to doing the right thing at work.
_____ 2. My work associates would describe me as someone who is always working to achieve
ethical performance, making every effort to be honorable in all my actions.
Theme 2: multiple values
_____ 3. I am the type of person who uses a guiding set of principles from the organization as
when I make ethical decisions on the job.
_____ 4. No matter what, I consider how both my organization’s values and my personal values
apply to the situation before making decisions.
Theme 3: endurance of threats
_____ 5. When I encounter an ethical challenge I take it on with moral action, regardless of how
it may pose a negative impact on how others see me.
_____ 6. I hold my ground on moral matters, even if there are opposing social pressures.
Theme 4: going beyond compliance
_____ 7. When I go about my daily tasks I make sure to comply with the rules, but also look to
understand their intent, to ensure that this is being accomplished as well.
_____ 8. It is important that we go beyond the legal requirements but seek to accomplish our
tasks with ethical action as well.
Theme 5: moral goals
_____ 9. It is important for me to use prudential judgment in making decisions at work.
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_____ 10. I think about my motives when achieving the mission, to ensure they are based upon
moral ends.
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Demographic Information
1. Gender:

Female

Male

2. Age: ______
3. Do you have the following certifications?
Certified Fraud Examiner

Yes

No

Certified Internal Auditor

Yes

No

Certified Public Accountant

Yes

No

Certified Management Accountant

Yes

No

4. Are you a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors?

Yes

No

5. Years of internal audit experience: _____
6. Highest college degree:

Bachelor

Graduate

7. Your current position:
Internal Audit (non-outsourced)

Internal Audit (outsourced)

Other _________

8. Who do you report to in your organization?
Audit Committee
Board of Directors
CEO
CFO
Management
Other
9. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding your position (check
one)?
I was an internal audit member, and the internal audit function was not outsourced.
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I was a member of an outsourced internal audit function.
10. For the case you completed, what is the likelihood that the majority of other internal
auditors would have included the finding in their internal audit report to management?
0% 10%

20%

Low Likelihood

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Moderate Likelihood
Thank you very much for your help!
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100%
High Likelihood

APPENDIX C
Survey Instrument for Chapter 3
(adapted from Norman, A. Rose, and J. Rose 2010)

Study of Internal Auditors
This questionnaire is part of a study designed to investigate the fraud risk assessments
made by internal auditors. I am requesting that you analyze the information provided in the
following pages and provide your judgments, as you would in the normal course of business. I
have limited the amount of information presented to limit the time necessary to complete the
study. Although you will not have all of the information you would typically have at your
disposal, it is important that you make your judgments to the best of your abilities given the
limited information set.
Your participation in this study is valuable to the advancement of research on internal
auditors. Please answer all questions carefully in the order presented. The questionnaire should
take less than 30 minutes to complete. Your responses are completely confidential and cannot be
traced to you or your company. If you would like a summary of the study results, please e-mail
pthmsqnn@memphis.edu and I will send a copy as soon as the results are tabulated.
Thank you for your help.
Porschia Nkansa, CPA
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When reading the case materials and responding to the questions, please make the
following assumptions:
1. Assume that you currently serve as an internal auditor for Davis Manufacturing Inc. and that
the internal audit function is not outsourced.
[For reviewers: the manipulation of the CAE’s emphasis on professional skepticism is
operationalized as the alternate assumptions below]
2. Assume that the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) expressed numerous times his concern about
implementing adequate planning considerations for this assessment with a sufficient level of
professional skepticism. Specifically, he is concerned about the internal audit staff members not
being sensitive enough to financial statement fraud risk, as this insensitivity may lead to
improper documentation and inaccurate conclusions. He would like the internal audit staff to
approach the assessment of fraud risk and the associated planning with the appropriate level of
professional skepticism, as suggested by IIA standards, and to complete this assessment as
effectively as possible. [Assume that the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) expressed numerous
times his concern about the associated costs of implementing planning considerations for this
assessment. Specifically, he is concerned about the internal audit staff members being overly
sensitive to financial statement fraud risk, as this sensitivity may lead to costly increases in
unjustified investigations and efficiency losses on the audit. He would like the assessment of
fraud risk and the associated planning to be sufficient to comply with IIA standards, but he hopes
that the internal audit staff will be aware of the costs and complete this assessment as efficiently
as possible.]
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I. Background
Davis Manufacturing Inc. engages in designing, engineering, and manufacturing woodto-wood, wood-to-concrete, and wood-to-masonry connectors, as well as screw fastening
systems and venting systems for gas and wood burning appliances. It also offers a line of
adhesives and mechanical anchors. The company markets its products to the residential
construction, commercial construction, remodeling, and do-it-yourself markets.
The 2013 financial statements of Davis Manufacturing were audited by a Big 4
independent public accounting firm, and Davis Manufacturing received an unqualified audit
opinion on the financial statements. Davis Manufacturing has been audited by the same
independent audit firm for the past 3 years, and it has received unqualified opinions on its
financial statements since it became a publicly traded company.
Most of the management team has been with Davis Manufacturing since you began
working in internal audit at the company eight years ago. Over the years, the management team
has been very easy to work with and has shown a high level of competence. Furthermore, several
sources of information indicate that the character of the management team is of a high quality.
For example, the partner in charge of the external audit has told you that the integrity of upper
management is impeccable. He also commented to you that the CEO is one of the most
honorable businessmen in the community and that he admires his leadership in local community
service organizations such as the United Way. Most people in the business community
characterize Davis Manufacturing as being very supportive of community values and high ideals.
This characterization stems largely from the high ideals of the management team.
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II. Fraud Risk Checklist
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 includes a checklist of 40 red flags that may indicate
risks of fraud. The items below are the red flags from this checklist that the internal audit
function determined were present for Davis Manufacturing in 2013.


High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.



Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy.



Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive-including financing
of major research and development or capital expenditures.



Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.



High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product
obsolescence, or interest rates.



Significant operations located or conducted across international borders where differing
business environments and cultures exist.

[For reviewers: the manipulation of the CAE’s emphasis on professional skepticism is repeated
in the sentence below]
The CAE has requested that the fraud risk assessment be completed as effectively
[efficiently] as possible with a sufficient level of professional skepticism [with an awareness
of the associated costs]:
What is the overall risk of financial statement fraud?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Low

Moderate

High

Risk

Risk

Risk
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Based on this fraud risk assessment, indicate the extent that you would expand your search
for information related to audit testing:
0
Not At All

1

2

3

4

To a Moderate
Extent

98

5

6

7

To an Extremely
Large Extent

Professional Skepticism Scale (Hurtt 2010)
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Need for Closure Scale* (Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem 1993; Roets and Van Hiel 2011)
1. I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
2. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
3. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.
6. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
7. When I have to make a decision, I feel relieved.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly.
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem
immediately.
10. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
11. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
15. I dislike unpredictable situations.
* Possible responses range from (1) “strongly disagree” to (6) “strongly agree.”
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Demographic Information

1. Gender:

Female

Male

2. Age: ______
3. Do you have the following certifications?
Certified Fraud Examiner

Yes

No

Certified Internal Auditor

Yes

No

Certified Public Accountant

Yes

No

Certified Management Accountant

Yes

No

4. Are you a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors?

Yes

No

5. Years of internal audit experience: _____
6. Years of external audit experience: _____
7. Have you ever evaluated fraud risk prior to completing this case?
Yes

No

8. Highest college degree:

Bachelor

Graduate

9. Your current position:
Internal Audit (non-outsourced)

Internal Audit (outsourced)

Other _________

10. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding your position (check
one)?
I was an internal audit member, and the internal audit function was not outsourced.
I was a member of an outsourced internal audit function.
11. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding the CAE’s emphasis
in this task (check one):
_____ The CAE requested that the fraud risk assessment be completed as efficiently as possible
with an awareness of the associated costs.
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_____ The CAE requested that the fraud risk assessment be completed as effectively as possible
with a sufficient level of professional skepticism.
12. For the case you completed, what is the risk of fraud that you believe the majority of
other internal auditors would have assessed?
0% 10%

20%

Low Likelihood

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Moderate Likelihood
Thank you very much for your help!
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90%

100%
High Likelihood
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